Three Essays On Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Models With Heterogeneous Agents And Financial Frictions by Zhao, Tianli
THREE ESSAYS ON DYNAMIC STOCHASTIC
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELS WITH
HETEROGENEOUS AGENTS AND FINANCIAL
FRICTIONS
A Dissertation
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Cornell University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
by
Tianli Zhao
August 2014
c© 2014 Tianli Zhao
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
THREE ESSAYS ON DYNAMIC STOCHASTIC GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM
MODELS WITH HETEROGENEOUS AGENTS AND FINANCIAL
FRICTIONS
Tianli Zhao, Ph.D.
Cornell University 2014
The thesis consists of three essays.
The first essay develops a two-country heterogeneous-agents model with
equilibrium default to explore the impact of financial integration between
emerging countries and the U.S. The model shows that inefficient credit moni-
toring in emerging countries makes the borrowers in these countries more prone
to default. The higher default risk makes financial intermediation in emerging
countries less efficient (e.g. higher interest rate spread, higher default rate and
lower borrowing capacity). Thus, households in emerging countries rely more
on their own savings to hedge against future uncertainty. As a result, these
countries have higher saving rate and lower saving return than the U.S. Given
this logic, once funds are allowed to move across borders, money will move
from emerging countries to the U.S seeking higher return. Thus, in the long
run, the U.S gradually accumulates foreign liability along with depressed inter-
est rate and relaxed credit limit. Meanwhile, the wealth inequality of the U.S
gradually increases, whereas the consumption inequality in the U.S is mitigated
due to the expanded consumer credit. The results are opposite for emerging
countries.
The second essay uses the modeling framework developed in the essay One
to draw important policy lessons pertaining to how an emerging country should
liberalize its capital account from an initial state of financial autarky. The model
shows that, due to the inefficient financial intermediation, financial opening up
by emerging countries may trigger a capital outflow in the short run. The sud-
den capital outflow raises the interest rate and crowds out domestic credit in
emerging countries, and therefore a fraction of households in these countries
become financially distressed, potentially leading to a liquidity crisis. The pa-
per then shows that financial integration has different welfare impacts across
households. For example, in emerging economies, rich households benefit from
the financial integration but poor suffer. Gradual change in financial openness
mitigates these differences leading to a higher overall welfare. Accordingly, the
paper argues for a more gradual approach to capital account opening for emerg-
ing countries.
The third essay explores the linkage between financial disruptions and busi-
ness cycles by studying the full equilibrium dynamics of an economy with two
regimes, ”normal business cycles” and ”financial disruptions”. The system be-
haves differently across the two regimes. During normal cycles, the economy
is fluctuating around the center of the stochastic steady state where agents are
able to maintain optimal capital stock through collateral borrowing. During
the episodes of financial disruptions, the productive agents are financially con-
strained and the economy may deviate from its efficient state, followed by a
sharp decline in output and capital price as well as a joint increase in risk pre-
mium and the Sharpe ratio. The basic mechanism of the model is the following:
since the return on capital is higher if it is owned by high-productivity agents, in
equilibrium high-productivity agents accumulate capital stocks through lever-
age. Due to the debt enforcement problem, there is a maximum level of leverage
determined by the financial market, which depends on the market’s projection
of the future value of collateral. The equilibrium leverage of high-productivity
agents occasionally hits the endogenous maximum level, in which case finan-
cial disruptions occur. Because of the precautionary motive, there is only a low
probability that the leverage constraint binds, while the absence of constraint
characterizes the economy most of the time. Therefore, the likelihood of finan-
cial disruption depends on the history of macro shocks and individual actions
that affect the equilibrium leverage. In other words, financial disruptions are
endogenous rare episodes evolved over business cycles.
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CHAPTER 1
GLOBAL IMBALANCE – THE LONG RUN IMPACT OF GLOBAL
FINANCIAL INTEGRATION
1.1 Introduction
Since the sharp increase in global financial integration in the early 1990s, the
United States has been gradually accumulating net foreign liabilities, which
now equal nearly 30% of the U.S. GDP. Meanwhile, the holding of the U.S. assets
by emerging countries has increased, resulting in global imbalances.
What causes such large capital flows from emerging countries to the United
States? This question is of great importance. Not only because the resulting
low interest rates and excessive borrowing by households in the United States
helped to cause the 2008 financial crisis (Perri and Quadrini 2013), but also the
ongoing global imbalance is expected to remain in the foreseeable future. Based
on International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates, the U.S. net foreign liability
is expected to reach 8% of the world’s output in 2014 (IMF World Economic
Outlook, October 2012).
In the literature, several factors are cited to explain global imbalances, in-
cluding differences in productivity growth (Hoffmann, Krause and Laubach,
2011), precautionary reserves (Carroll and Jeanne, 2009), demographic dynam-
ics (Backus, Cooley and Henriksen, 2013), and valuation effects (Obstfeld and
Rogoff, 2005). In addition, some studies explain global imbalances by reference
to financial markets. For example, Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008) ra-
tionalize global imbalances as an equilibrium outcome when separate regions
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differ in their capacity to generate financial assets from real investments. Men-
doza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2009) attribute global imbalances to differen-
tial enforcement of financial contracts.1 Panousi and Angeletos (2011) attribute
global imbalances to varying levels of uninsurable idiosyncratic risks across
countries.
This paper explains global imbalances from a new aspect of financial mar-
kets, namely cross-country differences in loan default rate caused by different
credit-monitoring efficiencies. Credit monitoring provides information about
an individual’s credit history, including volume of borrowing and payments,
late payments, and default. This information is important because the credit
market can use it to identify defaulted households and withhold credit from
those would-be borrowers. In some countries, however, such credit informa-
tion is not fully available. As shown in Figure 1.1, there is a wide cross-country
gap in the availability of credit information. This gap is especially prominent
between relatively underdeveloped credit markets in emerging countries and
the United States.
This paper uses a two-country heterogeneous-agents model with equilib-
rium default to show that differences in credit-monitoring efficiency between
emerging countries and the United States could account for the global imbal-
ance. The basic mechanism of the model involves three steps:
First, I show that, at the individual level, credit-monitoring efficiency af-
fects default decisions of the individual household. To do so, I explicitly model
equilibrium defaults as optimal choices made by some borrowers. Specifically,
1Specifically, they assume that borrowers in separate countries can divert different fractions
of individual income from creditors.
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Figure 1.1: Depth of Credit Information
Source:World Bank Doing Business dataset. The depth of credit information index measures
the coverage, scope, and accessibility of credit information available through either a public
credit registry or a private credit bureau.
an indebted household faces a trade-off associated with default: if it defaults,
it might be monitored due to a poor credit record and subsequently excluded
from future access to the credit market.2 On the other hand, default gives the
indebted household the benefit of being released from its debt obligation via its
bankruptcy filing. In a country with less efficient credit-monitoring, a defaulted
household is less likely to be discriminated against in the future, leading to a
2Such a default penalty is consistent with bankruptcy filing under Chapter 7 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code.
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higher expected value of default. Such a household is more likely to default for
any given debt contract.
Second, at the country level, credit-monitoring efficiency affects credit mar-
ket equilibrium. Specifically, I introduce a competitive financial intermediary
that offers a comprehensive schedule of lending rates, taking into account the
likelihood of default.3 The financial intermediary responds to the higher default
likelihood with a higher interest rate spread and tighter borrowing capacity.
Consequently, ceteris paribus, in a country with less efficient credit monitoring,
borrowing is more difficult and households must rely more on their savings to
hedge against future uncertainty, leading to a higher saving rate and a lower
return on savings in equilibrium.
Third, the varying levels of credit-monitoring efficiency between emerging
countries and the United States could account for international capital flow dur-
ing financial integration. In the long run, the United States (or emerging coun-
tries) gradually accumulates foreign liabilities (or assets) along with declining
(or rising) interest rates and an expanded (or contracted) credit limit.
This paper contributes to the literature by establishing a deep micro-
foundation for explaining the linkage between credit monitoring and household
default decisions while allowing for equilibrium default.4 This not only makes
the model more realistic, it also enables me to explain cross-country differences
3Such a contractual debt arrangement is similar to the arrangement modeled in Chatterjee,
Corbae, Nakajima, and Rios-Rull (2007) and Arellano (2008).
4Prior studies do not allow borrowers to default, or they assume that the financial market
can fully eliminate default so that default never occurs in equilibrium. However, there is com-
pelling evidence that default always occurs. Moreover, the default rate and the interest rate
spread are persistently higher in emerging countries than in the U.S.
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in factors such as the default rate, the interest rate spread, and credit capac-
ity, that have not been explained in prior studies (see Appendix).5 All of these
factors are important for predicting the impact of financial integration between
emerging countries and the United States.
Moreover, the use of an incomplete-market heterogeneous-agent framework
enables the model to characterize the evolution of wealth distribution during
financial integration. The model shows that the U.S. wealth inequality increases
after financial integration, whereas the U.S. consumption inequality is mitigated
due to the expansion of consumer credit for households in the United States,
consistent with empirical evidence.6
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 presents the theo-
retical model for a closed economy, Section 1.3 characterizes the autarky equi-
librium and shows how monitoring efficiency affects the domestic credit market
equilibrium, Section 1.4 extends the model to a two-country world and explores
the impact of financial integration between emerging countries and the United
States, and Section 1.5 concludes.
5For example, the model predicts that the credit market in the U.S has a lower interest rate
spread, a lower default rate, and higher borrowing limits than emerging countries, consistent
with stylized facts.
6For the empirical findings on the evolution of wealth inequality and consumption inequal-
ity, see Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston (2008), Diaz-Gimenez, Glover and Rios-Rull (2011), Has-
sett and Mathur (2012) and Wolff (2010). In another relevant paper, Armour, Burkhauser and
Larrimore (2013) argue that incorporating accrued capital gains to measure yearly changes in
wealth would dramatically reduce the observed growth in the U.S. inequality.
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1.2 The Theoretical Model
This section constructs the model of optimal default and endogenous debt con-
tracts in the context of a closed economy. There are three sectors: a production
sector, a household sector and a financial intermediary sector.
Environment and Demographics:
In this study’s theoretical model, the economy consists of a large number
of heterogeneous households with the same preferences, but household labor
productivity is subject to idiosyncratic shocks. As in Chatterjee, Corbase, Naka-
jima, and Rois-Rull (2007), during each specified time period, a fraction (1−ρ) of
the population in each country will die and the same number of newborn will
enter the economy with clean financial records.7 Thus, the total population for
each country is constant.
Production Sector:
In the baseline model, I assume a competitive production sector that pro-
duces consumption goods using linear technology:
yt =
∫
θt(st)n¯dµ(st) (1.1)
where θt(st) is idiosyncratic labor productivity and µ(st) is the population mea-
sure at the current level of productivity st. To keep the analytical model straight-
forward, I assume for now that the productivity shock is independent and iden-
tically distributed (i.i.d) with log-normal density. For the quantitative analysis,
I allow these idiosyncratic household productivity shocks to follow a first order
7For simplicity, I assume the wealth of each dying agent, positive or negative, will be inher-
ited by each newborn.
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autoregressive (AR(1)) process. n¯ is the individual labor endowment, which is
normalized to be one for all households. For the quantitative analysis, I allow
the labor endowment to vary across households to match the household income
distribution. In equilibrium, each unit of labor is paid at its marginal product,
which is just equal to the realization of productivity:
wt(st) = θt(st) (1.2)
Households:
Taking into account the possibility of death, the individual household pref-
erences are given by the expected value of a discounted sum of monetary utility
functions:
E0{
∞∑
t=0
(βρ)tu(ct(st))} (1.3)
where 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor, and ct(st) is consumption in period t when
state st is realized. All households have the same standard CRRA utility func-
tion u(ct(st)) = ct(st)
1−γ
1−γ , which is strictly increasing, concave, and differentiable.
Households borrow and save by means of trading bonds. Similar to Chatterjee,
Corbase, Nakajima and Rois-Rull (2007), I posit a market arrangement whereby
unsecured loans of different sizes are treated as distinct financial assets. There-
fore, the budget constraint faced by each household who chooses to honor its
debt is given by equation (4):
ct + qt(bt+1)bt+1 = bt + wt(st), (1.4)
where bt+1 is the bond position of the household (negative bt+1 corresponds to
debt liability), and qt(bt+1) is the bond price, which is a function of loan size bt+1.
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Including a default option in the model necessitates departing from the con-
ventional saving problem. At the beginning of each period, a household can
choose whether to honor its debt. If the household chooses to default, then it
is released from its liability (i.e., bond position “b” is set back to zero), but the
household has the probability λ of being reported as having a bad credit history
(given a default flag) by the countrys credit-monitoring system. Once a house-
hold is given a default flag, it will be penalized (or discriminated against) by the
credit market in the future.
To make the model realistic, I incorporate both pecuniary and non-pecuniary
default costs. Here I assume a specific type of non-pecuniary cost against a de-
faulted household; that is, such a household is prohibited by the credit mar-
ket from borrowing. Such a non-pecuniary default cost is commonly seen in
credit markets and is widely adopted by studies on default decisions (see, for
example, Fay et al., 1998; Chatterjee et al., 2007; and Athreya et al., 2012). Here
the pecuniary cost of default (such as higher borrowing premium and auto in-
surance premiums) is modeled as it is in Chatterjee, Corbase, Nakajima, and
Rois-Rull (2007), who assume that a household with a default flag experiences a
loss equal to a fraction φ of its earnings. Moreover, I assume that the defaulting
agent will experience the worst income realization during the default period.
This assumption captures actual market observations whereby an agent who
files for bankruptcy protection can consume only his basic salary (amounting to
the lower bound of income realization) for that period.
Note that a higher λ implies that a defaulted household is more likely to be
discriminated against in the future. Therefore, the parameter λ characterizes the
market’s credit-monitoring efficiency.
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To formalize the households problem recursively, let V(b, s, λ) denote the
optimal expected lifetime utility of a household with a clean financial record,
which has bond position b and current income state s. Note that the house-
holds value function V(.) also depends on credit-monitoring efficiency λ, as it
affects the households optimal default choice.8 Specifically, the default decision
is characterized by equation (5):
V(b, s, λ) = max{Vc(b, s, λ), λ[u(y) + βρE{Vd(0, s′, λ)}] + (1 − λ)V(0, s, λ)}. (1.5)
As shown in equation equation (5), an indebted household faces a trade-off
associated with its default action. The first term on the right-hand-side Vc(b, s, λ)
denotes the optimal expected lifetime utility of the household if he chooses to
honor his debt contract in the current period. In this case, he faces the following
problem:
Vc(b, s, λ) = max
c,b′
{u(c) + βρ
∑
s′
p(s′)V(b′, s′, λ)} (1.6)
subject to the recursive borrowing constraint:
c(b, s, λ) + q(b′, λ)b′(b, s, λ) = b + w(s). (1.7)
The second term on the right-hand-side, λ[u(y) + βρE{Vd(0, s′, λ)}] + (1 −
λ)V(0, s, λ) gives the expected value of default. If the indebted household de-
faults, the default action gives it the benefit of having its debt obligation released
via a bankruptcy filing. On the other hand, it is possible (i.e., with probability
λ) that the defaulting household will be reported as having a poor credit record.
In this case, the household can only consumes its lowest income realization y
8Note that λ is a time-invariant parameter under this setup. For notational convenience, it
is specified as a function argument.
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during the default period, and then it will be subsequently excluded from fu-
ture access to the credit market. Formally, u(y) + βρE{Vd(0, s′, λ)} is the value of
a defaulting household reported with a bad credit record (default flag). Once
given the default flag, the household is partially excluded from the credit mar-
ket, i.e., it can save but it cannot borrow. The household then faces the following
problem in the future:
Vd(b, s, λ) = max
cd ,b′d
{u(cd) + βρ
∑
s′
p(s′)Vd(b′, s′, λ)} (1.8)
subject to:
cd(b, s, λ) + q(b′, λ)b′d(b, s, λ) = b + φw(s). (1.9)
and an additional no-borrowing constraint: b′d ≥ 0. Because of the inefficient
credit monitoring, it is also possible (i.e., with probability 1 − λ) that the de-
faulted household will not be reported with a poor credit record. In this case,
the household is able to get rid of its debt obligation while maintaining a clean
credit record (so that its value becomes V(0, s, λ)).
The household chooses to default whenever its expected value of default
is higher than the value of honoring its debt obligation, that is: Vc(b′, s′, λ) <
λ[u(y) + βρE{Vd(0, s′′, λ)}] + (1 − λ)V(0, s′, λ). Whether a household will default
depends on the realization of s′; hence, it is unknown at the time when the bond
contract b′ is issued. To derive the probability of default, let D(b′, λ) be the set of
future productivity realizations s′ for which default is optimal at bond position
b′. Specifically,
D(b′, λ) = {s′ ∈ S : Vc(b′, s′, λ) < λ[u(y) + βρE{Vd(0, s′′, λ)}] + (1 − λ)V(0, s′, λ)}.(1.10)
Then, the default probability Pr(b′, λ) can be characterized by the measure of
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default sets:
Pr(b′, λ) = µ(D(b′, λ)). (1.11)
A typical household’s policy functions and value functions are illustrated
in Figure 1.2.9 Note that the “jumps” on the consumption curves (panel 1)
and saving curves (panel 2) occur when households choose to default. When
a household decides to default, its debt position will be cleared to zero in the
next period.10 Consequently, the defaulted household (if caught by the credit-
monitoring system), will be excluded from future borrowing. Thus, its future
consumption/saving decisions follow the new policy rule (panels 3 and 4).
Moreover, the inclusion of the default option also leads to the non-concavity
of the value functions (panel 5)
Risk-neutral competitive financial intermediaries:
In each country, there are competitive risk-neutral banks. Each bank can
borrow or lend to other banks at a risk-free interbank interest rate. Each bank
maximizes the present discounted value of current and future cash flows:
max
∞∑
t=0
R−1f pit. (1.12)
pit =
∫
(1 − Pr(bt, λ))btdµ(st−1, bt) −
∫
q(bt+1, λ)bt+1dµ(st, bt+1), (1.13)
where (1 − Pr(bt, λ)) is the probability of receiving the repayment for the partic-
9For visibility, only a subset of all possible states are plotted.
10Note that the plotted consumption curves in the default case are not necessarily the actual
policy. The actual consumption during the default period depend on whether they are reported
as having a bad credit record by the monitoring system.
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Figure 1.2: Policy Functions, Value Functions and Income Distribution
Panel (1)-Consumption Function; Panel (2)-Saving Function; Panel (3)-Consumption policy
with default flag; Panel (4)-Saving policy with default flag; Panel (5)- Value function; Panel
(6)- Income Distribution
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Figure 1.3: Endogenous Bond Schedule and Borrowing Limit
ular loan contract.11 The zero-profit condition implies that, under equilibrium,
risk-neutral creditors set the price schedule as:12
q(b′, λ) =
1
R f
(1 − Pr(b′, λ)) (1.14)
11If some borrowers do not survive to repay their loans and some depositors do not survive
to collect on their deposits, some newborns will inherit their debt/asset positions. So in such
cases banks do not need to consider the survival probability.
12It is easy to see that any bond price other than q(s, b′, λ) will lead to either zero or an infinite
supply of this particular bond contract.
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The upper panel of Figure 1.3 illustrates an endogenous bond schedule as a
function of the loan size (for a fixed value of λ). One can see that the bond price
decreases with the total volume of debt. This is because households are more
likely to default when they have more debt.13
The lower panel of Figure 1.3 plots the total amount of indebtedness by
household, which is the product of the bond price q(b′, λ) and the volume of
bonds b′ (i.e. a = q(b′, λ)b′). As the bond price decreases with total volume
issued, the household at some point is no longer able to accumulate debt by
issuing more bonds. In other words, there is a limit to the household’s indebt-
edness. In the example given in the lower panel of Figure 1.3, the household
would never optimally choose a bond contract with b < b∗, because it can find
an alternative contract that increases consumption today by the same amount
while incurring lower liability for the next period. Therefore, the household’s
endogenous borrowing limit is given by a = q(b∗, λ)b∗. Moreover, b1 is the lowest
asset position that is default-free. Thus, “risky loans” refer to bond contracts in
the range of b ∈ [b∗, b1], which carry positive default premiums up to 1/q − R f .14
The bond schedule q(b′, λ) is also a function of λ, which characterizes the
efficiency of credit monitoring. A lower λ, which is associated with less efficient
monitoring, implies that a defaulted household is less likely to be discriminated
against in the future, leading to a higher expected value of default. Therefore,
in a market with a lower λ, a household is more likely to default for any given
debt level. Consequently, the financial intermediary responds to this higher
default likelihood with a higher saving-loan spread as well as tighter borrowing
13The property is proved analytically in a similar setup by Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981; Chat-
terjee et al., 2007; and Arellano, 2007)
14q is the lowest bond price that can possibly be observed in equilibrium.
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capacity (Figure 1.4).
Note that competitive financial intermediaries take the market risk-free rate
as given. Thus, the results above constitute partial equilibrium outcomes. The
following section characterizes the general equilibrium under which the risk-
free rate is determined to clear the credit market for all heterogeneous house-
holds.
1.3 Characterizing Credit Market Equilibrium
This section characterizes the general equilibrium for a closed credit market in
which the fund is not allowed to flow in and out of the country. It begins with
the definition of such a stationary equilibrium. Then, the parameter values cali-
brated for the numerical solutions are discussed. With these parameter values, I
used a reasonably calibrated example to demonstrate the impact of credit mon-
15
Figure 1.4: Bond Schedule and Borrowing Limit with Different λ.
Upper Panel:Bond Schedule. Lower Panel:Borrowing Limit. The solid line corresponds with λ1
and the dashed line corresponds with λ2. λ1 > λ2
itoring on the domestic credit market.
The steady state equilibrium for a closed economy is defined as:
Definition 1 Steady State Equilibrium for a Closed Economy:15
With no international capital mobility, a steady-state competitive equilibrium for
an economy with monitoring-efficiency λ is a set of strictly positive wage w(s), the
risk-free interest rate R f (λ), loan-price schedule q(b′, s, λ), strictly positive quantities
of aggregate labor demand N, net interbank borrowing/lending Bint, and decision rules
15The equilibrium of a closed domestic credit market without international mobility of cap-
ital is similar to the economy studied by Chatterjee Corbase, Nakajima and Rois-Rull; the exis-
tence of such a steady state equilibrium is proven in Chatterjee et al 2007.
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c(b, s, λ, d f ), and b′(b, s, λ, d f ),16 and a distribution of households µ(s, b, d f ) such that:
(i) decision rules c(b, s, λ, d f ) and b′(b, s, λ, d f ) solve the household’s optimization
problem.
(ii) aggregate labor demand N solves the firm’s optimization problem.
(iii) all bond contracts satisfy the intermediary’s optimization problem.
(iv) the labor market clears.
(v) Bint = 0, interbank borrowing/lending clears domestically.
(vi) the asset market clears:
∫
q(b′, s, λ)b′(b, s, λ, d f )dµ(s, b, d f ) = 0.17
The computation procedures in this study are an extension of those put
forth by Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima, and Rios-Rull (2007) in their work on
consumer credit with default risk. Computing the equilibrium requires four
steps: an inner loop in which the household decision problem’s given bond
price schedules are solved; a middle loop in which the bond schedule converges
given the risk-free interest rate; and an outer loop in which the market-clearing
risk-free rate is obtained. Finally, the parameter values that yield equilibrium
allocations with the desired properties are determined.18 The calibration of pa-
rameter values is discussed below.
16The fourth argument in the policy function is the default flag. df=0 means the households
credit record is clean, while df=1 means a bad credit record. Thus, c(b, s, λ, 1) = cd(b, s, λ). More-
over, the default decision is embedded in the households consumption/saving policies.
17Note that under financial autarky, condition (v) and (vi) automatically imply each other.
18This paper’s computation load is intensive. The numerical algorithm is coded in Matlab
and Fortran-95
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1.3.1 Calibration of Parameter Values:
The model is calibrated to match key the statistics for the U.S. As the bench-
mark economy, the U.S. economy is assumed to have the most efficient credit-
monitoring system in the world, corresponding to the case in which λ = 1.
To enhance the quantitatively property of the model, the theoretical model
discussed in Section 1.2 is generalized in the following two aspects.
First, to quantitatively match the income distribution of households in the
United States, I allow the labor endowment η j to vary across households.19
I divide households into seven groups each with different labor endowment.
The population measure {µηh} and the labor endowment {ηh} for each group
h ∈ {1, 2..7} are jointly calibrated to match the income distribution of the U.S.
household.20 (see Figure 1.6) Due to the homogeneous property of the CRRA
utility, it is straightforward to show that the labor endowment η j can be reduced
from the endogenous state space by normalizing the bond position as the share
of the expected household income.21 For notational convenience, I hereafter use
the letter b j denotes the normalized bond position as percentage of expected
income for household j, while its labor endowment η j is omitted.
Second, I added the persistence of the idiosyncratic shocks by assuming that
19One interpretation of this heterogeneity is that households are endowed with different tal-
ents. It is also very common that the aggregate labor units from all family members are varying
across households.
20The data on the income distribution of the U.S. household is from the US Census Bureau;
Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2011
21The policy space and the state space of the household with a higher labor endowment are
just scaled replicas of the others.
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Table 1.1: Parameters of Labor Endowment and Income Distribution
Statistics Target Model Parameter Value
% earning of the lowest 10% 1.07% 1.08% η1 0.1065
% earning of the lowest 20% 3.50% 3.54% η2 0.3084
% earning of the lowest 30% 7.28% 7.26% η3 0.6028
% earning of the lowest 40% 12.47% 12.39% η4 0.9673
% earning of the lowest 50% 19.15% 18.95% η5 1.4019
% earning of the lowest 60% 27.60% 27.43% η6 2.1730
% earning of the lowest 70% 38.31% 38.28% η7 3.1543
% earning of the lowest 80% 52.10% 51.93% µη1 0.1
% earning of the lowest 90% 70.25% 70.16% µη2 0.2
% earning of top 5% 18.52% 18.52% µη3 0.2
income GINI 0.4440 0.4442 µη4 0.2
mean/median 1.33 1.33 µη5 0.2
overall mean income 1.00 1.00 µη6 0.15
the productivity of household j follows an log-AR(1) process:
ln(θ jt ) = µ(1 − ρ) + ρln(θ jt−1) + σe jt ,
where e jt ∼ i.i.d.N(0, 1). The expected individual log-productivity µ is normal-
ized to one without loss of generality. The persistence parameter ρ and standard
deviation σ are estimated by Heaton and Lucas (1996) on the basis of evidence
from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for households in the United
States.22 To numerically approximate the AR(1) process using Markov transi-
tioning matrix, the continuous AR(1) process is discretized by a large number
22Heaton and Lucas estimate the idiosyncratic income process per family member, there-
fore the estimated ρ and σ are consistent with the idiosyncratic productivity process in this
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Figure 1.5: Bond Schedule for a Typical U.S. Household as a Function of
the Household Productivity State s and Bond Volume b.
of productivity states using Gauss-Hermite quadrature.
It is worth noting that, due to the persistence of the productivity shocks,
the default probability now becomes the conditional measure of the default set,
which depends on the current productivity state. That is,
Pr(b′, s, λ) = µ(D(b′, s, λ) | s).
By the same token, the bond schedule is also a function of current state:
q(b′, s, λ) = 1R f (1−Pr(b′, s, λ)). Figure 1.5 plots the bond schedule for a U.S. house-
hold with n = 1.
Besides the parameters associated with idiosyncratic productivity process
paper. The cross-sectional differences in households expected income are captured by the cross-
households-variation of labor endowment η j.
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Table 1.2: Parameter Values
Notation Parameter Name Value Targets and Sources
ρ shock persistence 0.529 Heaton and Lucas (1996)
σ shock standard deviation 0.251 Heaton and Lucas (1996)
β time preference 0.969 Average Risk-Free rate = 3.30%
φ1 pecuniary cost of default 0.039 the U.S. default rate = 1%
ρ birth/death rate 0.02 Average adult life = 50 years
γ relative risk-aversion 2 Standard value
and labor endowment distribution, there are other parameters to be determined.
(Table 1.2)
The birth/death rate ρ is determined to match the average length of an adult
life, taken to be 50 years. The pecuniary cost of having a bad credit record φ is
set to target the default rate of U.S. households at 1%.
Moreover, I adopt standard time-separable constant relative risk-aversion
preferences that are characterized by two parameters: the discount rate β and
the risk-aversion coefficient γ. The coefficient of relative risk aversion γ is set
to a standard value of 2. The discount rate β is calibrated to target the risk-free
interest rate at the historical average risk-free interest rate in the United States
before the era of financial integration.
All calibrations are performed jointly using the Simulated Method of Mo-
ments. Although the model is highly stylized, it matches some key features of
the U.S. data.
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Figure 1.6: The Income Lorenz Curve (U.S). Model v.s Data
1.3.2 The Impact of Credit Monitoring on the Domestic Credit
Market
As discussed at the end of the previous section, under partial equilibrium at a
given risk-free interest rate, the financial intermediary responds to a greater de-
fault likelihood with a higher saving-loan spread and tighter borrowing capac-
ity. Consequently, in a credit market with lower λ, borrowing is more difficult
and households must rely on their own savings to hedge against idiosyncratic
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income risk, leading to a higher saving rate.
Under general equilibrium, this higher saving rate, which is motivated by
household precaution, results in a lower equilibrium return on savings. More-
over, I also show in Figure 1.7 and Figure 1.8 that other equilibrium variables
such as the default rate, the loan-deposit spread, the borrowing limit, and mean
and median loan sizes are all functions of λ. In short, the model clearly iden-
tifies a relationship between credit market equilibrium and credit monitoring
efficiency.
As shown in the introduction, emerging countries typically are less efficient
at monitoring credit compared with the United States. Thus, the model predicts
higher loan-deposit spreads, higher default rates, and lower borrowing capacity
in emerging countries than in the United States. All these results are consistent
with the stylized empirical features mentioned in the introduction.
Because of these differences regarding domestic credit market equilibrium,
money flows from emerging countries to the United States during the process
of global financial integration. In the next section, the paper applies the above
model to a two-country world with differential credit-monitoring efficiencies to
study the impact of financial integration between emerging countries and the
United States.
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Figure 1.7: The Impact of Credit Monitoring on Domestic Credit Market
Equilibrium
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Figure 1.8: Loan-deposit-spread Given Various Credit Monitoring Effi-
ciency λ
lambda=1 in black; lambda=0.8 in blue; lambda=0.7 in red.
1.4 Financial Integration Between Emerging Countries and the
United States
After discussing domestic credit market equilibrium with no international cap-
ital mobility, Section 1.4 investigates the potential impact of financial integra-
tion between emerging countries and the United States. To do so, I applied the
model to a two-country world in which countries C1 and C2 differ only in re-
gards to their domestic credit-monitoring efficiency. C1 (representing the U.S.)
practices highly efficient credit monitoring, so households inC1, once in default,
will forever carry poor credit records (i.e., λ1 = 1). In comparison, C2 (repre-
senting a set of key emerging countries) has a less developed credit-monitoring
system. Therefore, defaulted households in C2 are less likely to be monitored
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with a default flag. (i.e., λ2 < λ1 ).23 As explained in Section 1.3, without interna-
tional capital mobility, the less efficient credit monitoring of emerging countries
results a lower return on savings in these countries, compared with the savings
in the United States.
Once two countries are financially integrated, however, money is able to
move across their borders. Capital mobility therefore enables households to
trade financial assets with both domestic and foreign financial intermediaries.
Moreover, financial intermediaries can also borrow/lend with foreign counter-
parts via interbank loans. In other words, the credit market is now worldwide,
instead of confined within each country. The definition of steady-state equilib-
rium with globally integrated capital markets is given below:
Definition 2 Steady State Equilibrium with Integrated World Financial Markets:
With perfect international mobility of capital, a steady-state competitive equilib-
rium is a set consisting of strictly positive wage wi(s), world-wide risk-free interest
rate, R f , loan-price schedules qi(b′, s, λi), strictly positive quantities of aggregate la-
bor demand N i, net interbank borrowing/lending Biint, decision rules c
i(b, s, λi, d f ) and
b′i(b, s, λi, d f ), and distributions of households µi(s, b, d f ) such that:
(i) decision rules ci(b, s, λi, d f ) and b′i(b, s, λi, d f ) solve every household’s problem in
each country i.
23Following Mendoza et al. (2009), I assume the credit monitoring is residence-based. That is,
residents in Ci are monitored by country i’s credit-monitoring system. Financial integration will
not change a country’s monitoring efficiency in the short run. This is a reasonable assumption
because the enforcement and monitoring of loan contracts depends heavily on the local legal
environment and market institutions.
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(ii) aggregate labor demand N i solves the firm’s optimization problem in each country
i.
(iii) all bond contracts satisfy the intermediary’s optimization problem.
(iv) the labor market clears in each country.
(v)
∑
i=1,2 Biint = 0, interbank borrowing/lending clears internationally.
(vi) the asset market clears:24
∑
i=1,2
∫
qi(b′, s, λi)b′i(b, s, λi, d f )dµi(s, b, d f ) = 0.
With an integrated financial market, risk-free interest rates R f are equated
across countries.
1.4.1 Calibration of Credit-Monitoring Efficiency and Simu-
lated Statistics
As shown in the introduction, there is a significant cross-country difference in
credit-monitoring efficiency. The difference is especially prominent between the
United States and emerging countries.25 However, it is difficult to derive a direct
mapping of these indicators to actual values of λi. Therefore, I follow Mendoza
et al. 2009’s pragmatic approach – I assume that the United States has the most
efficient credit monitoring (i.e. λ1 = 1 ) and then calibrate λ2 for the emerging
economies to match the U.S. Net Foreign Liability (NFL). Using the Simulated
Method of Moments, the parameter λ2 is calibrated to be 0.701 and the U.S.
24Note that under financial autarky, condition (v) and (vi) automatically imply each other.
25Besides the World Bank’s Doing Business database, there are other indicators, such as the
Financial Development Index (IMF 2006) and the index of financial liberalization (Abiad et al.,
2008) all suggesting that the efficiency of financial intermediation differs significantly between
the United States and emerging countries.
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Table 1.3: Calibrate the Efficiency of Credit Monitoring
Notation Parameter Name Value Targets and Sources
λ1 prob of being monitored in C1 1.00 The U.S. is assumed
to have perfect
credit-monitoring
system
λ2 prob of being monitored in C2 0.701 Match the U.S. NFA
position at S.S.
NFL is targeted at 22% of the U.S. GDP (Table 1.3).26 The main statistics from
numerical simulation of financial integration are shown in Table 1.4.27
Before the integration of world financial markets:
The borrowing limit for households in the United States at the median pro-
ductivity state is about 126% of their average labor income. In comparison,
households in emerging countries have restricted access to credit markets. The
borrowing limit for emerging country households at the median productivity
state is about 94% of their average labor income. As a result, the risk-free in-
terest rate is 115 basis points higher in the United States than it is in emerging
countries. Moreover, the default rate of the U.S. households is targeted at 1%.
The default rate in emerging markets is significantly higher, as households in
these countries default on 3.07% of the loan contracts.
26The imbalance between emerging countries and the United States is roughly 22% of the
U.S. GDP.
27Because the U.S. economy is approximately the same size as that of all key emerging mar-
kets combined, C1 and C2 are considered to be of the same size. All other parameters have the
same value as those discussed in Section 1.3.
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Table 1.4: Simulation Results (Steady State)
Autarky Integrated
C1 C2 C1 C2
Risk-Free Interest Rate 3.30 2.15 2.88 2.88
Borrowing Limit in s (% of Ex-
pected Income)
90.03% 59.59% 101.08% 52.43%
Borrowing Limit in median(s) (%
of Expected Income)
126.02% 94.26% 136.51% 84.95%
Borrowing Limit in s¯ (% of Ex-
pected Income)
181.03% 144.65% 188.21% 135.65%
max indebtedness (% of Expected
Income)
100.01% 71.29% 110.61% 63.01%
median indebtedness (% of Ex-
pected Income)
57.12% 42.09% 65.12% 34.99%
mean indebtedness (% of Ex-
pected Income)
55.66% 40.09% 62.50% 34.27%
Wealth GINI 0.6464 0.5653 0.7032 0.5462
Consumption GINI 0.4304 0.4311 0.4307 0.4304
Default Rate (% of population) 1.00% 3.07% 1.02% 2.52%
Net Foreign Asset Position (% of
the U.S. GDP)
N/A N/A -22.00% 22.00%
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With integrated world financial markets:
In the steady state, the world risk-free interest rate is equalized at 2.88%.
(Figure 1.10). Because the U.S. interest rate decreased during financial integra-
tion, U.S. households borrowed more from emerging countries, creating a nega-
tive Net Foreign Asset (NFA) position. Interestingly, the gap between credit ac-
cessibility in the United States and emerging countries has not narrowed but in-
stead widened following global financial integration. For households in emerg-
ing countries, the borrowing limit is depressed by roughly 11%. Meanwhile, the
borrowing limit for households in the U.S. rises by around 11%. As shown in
Figure 1.11, the steady-state wealth distribution of the U.S. (emerging countries)
in the integrated steady state shifts to the left (right) relative to those in the au-
tarky steady state. In other words, following financial integration, households
in the U.S. borrow more than before, while households in emerging countries
save more than before. As a result, the United States gradually accumulates
NFL, eventually reaching about 22% of the U.S. GDP.
It is also worth noting that financial integration affects the wealth distribu-
tion as well as consumption distributions. For the United States, the wealth
inequality increases during the period of financial integration. The wealth GINI
coefficient rises from 0.6464 to 0.7032. (See the left panel of Figure 1.9).28 In com-
parison, the consumption inequality changes very little. (See the right panel
of Figure 1.9). The consumption GINI coefficient rises slightly from 0.4304 to
0.4307. The larger increase in wealth inequality relative to consumption in-
equality is consistent with empirical observations (see for example, Blundell,
Pistaferri and Preston, 2008; Budria, Diaz-Gimenez, Quadrini and Rios-Rull,
28The wealth of household j at period t is the sum of its beginning financial position b jt and
its income w(st)η j. That is, a
j
t (st) = b
j
t + w(st)η j.
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2002; Hassett amd Mathur, 2012; and Wolff, 2010).
Figure 1.9: Wealth Inequality and Consumption Inequality of the U.S.
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Figure 1.10: Determination of the World Risk Free Rate
1.5 Conclusion
This paper explores the long run impacts of financial integration between
emerging countries and the United States. Emerging countries typically have
a higher domestic loan default rate than the United States which is attributable
to the less efficient domestic financial intermediation in emerging countries. In
the long run, financial integration leads to global financial imbalances: emerg-
ing countries with less efficient financial intermediation and higher domestic
loan default rates accumulate the U.S. assets in a gradual, long-lasting process.
These patterns are consistent with the features of the global external imbalances
that have been observed since the beginning of the financial integration process.
The model can generate these patterns as the natural outcome of financial
integration in a stylized world in which domestic credit-monitoring efficiency
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Figure 1.11: Wealth Distributions
Upper Panel - Wealth Distribution of Households in the U.S.; Lower Panel - Wealth
Distribution of Emerging Country Households.
is the only source of cross-country heterogeneity. The less efficient credit moni-
toring that characterizes emerging countries results in higher default probabil-
ity, which then disrupts the functioning of the financial sector and diminishes
the aggregate credit that is available in the economy. The direct manifestations
of this financial heterogeneity are a higher loan-deposit spread, higher default
rates, and lower credit capacity in emerging countries compared with what oc-
curs in the United States. All these results are consistent with stylized empirical
features.
In the quantitative analysis, a two-country version of the heterogeneous-
agents saving/default model is calibrated to match the data on interest rates,
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income distribution, and NFA position. The autarky equilibrium suggests that,
in the United States, the risk-free rate is 115 basis points higher than it is in
emerging countries. As a result of the financial integration, the U.S. NFA posi-
tion gradually declines to −22% of GDP and the U.S interest rate is depressed
by 41 basis points.
34
CHAPTER 2
THE SHORT RUN RISK OF LIQUIDITY CRISIS DURING FINANCIAL
INTEGRATION
2.1 Introduction
Many emerging countries such as China have been adopting gradual financial
reforms to slowly integrate their financial markets with the rest of the world.
One reason for this integration process being slow and gradual is that the policy
makers in these countries are concerned with the potential short run risk of sud-
den cross-border capital flows which may bring turmoil to domestic economies.
This essay extends the modeling framework developed in the first essay
to study the short run risk of capital outflow during financial integration for
emerging countries. The model shows that, due to the inefficient financial inter-
mediation, financial opening up by emerging countries might trigger a capital
outflow in the short run. The sudden capital outflow from countries with less ef-
ficient financial markets raises the interest rate and crowds out domestic credit,
and therefore a fraction of households in these countries become financially dis-
tressed, potentially leading to a liquidity crisis.
Given this potential risk of sudden liquidity crisis, the essay seeks policy
questions pertaining whether different strategies to liberalize a country’s capital
account from an initial state of financial autarky would have different impacts
on the economy and on welfare. To do so, several policy experiments associated
with various opening-up strategies are conducted and compared.
In particular, the essay demonstrates that the aforementioned liquidity crisis
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is more likely to occur if an emerging country liberalizes its capital account in
an “unanticipated, once-and-for-all” fashion. In comparison, a more “gradual”
opening-up strategy could help avoid the liquidity crisis, as borrowers could
adjust more smoothly from a regime of cheap credit to a more expensive one.
Furthermore, a short run fiscal transfer to financially distressed households in
emerging countries improves welfare and can protect financial intermediaries
from potential large scale default during capital account liberalization.
The analysis of this essay is built upon the modeling framework developed
in essay One. The heterogeneous agents saving model with endogenous default
option is well suited in accomplishing the goal of this essay. The advantages are
three threefold.
First, the inclusion of the default option and endogenous debt contracts al-
lows the model to characterize the potential “liquidity crisis” associated with a
sudden capital outflow, including stylized features such as temporary spikes of
the risk premium and the default rate as well as temporary credit and consump-
tion crunches.
Second, the adoption of the two-country model enables the characterization
of both the source and the destination of international capital flow. In other
words, the model can compare the dynamic equilibrium of emerging countries
with that of the United States during their financial integration.
The last but not the least, the incomplete-market heterogeneous-agent
framework developed in essay One enables the evaluation of the welfare im-
pact on households across wealth classes. Specifically, the model shows that in
emerging economies rich households benefit from capital account liberalization
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while the poor suffer. (These results are the opposite for the U.S.)
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 studies the short-run
dynamic equilibrium of financial integration under various opening-up scenar-
ios, Section 2.3 discusses the welfare implications, Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 Policy Experiments – Opening-up Scenarios and Fiscal
Policies
The steady state analysis in essay One demonstrates that, before the financial
integration, the market clearing risk-free interest rate is lower in an emerging
country with less efficient financial market than it in the United States. There-
fore, after the emerging country financially integrates with the United States, the
real risk-free rate in the emerging country must go up to equalize with the U.S.
interest rate. During this transition, how would households from the emerging
country adjust from a cheap credit regime to one characterized by more expen-
sive borrowing? Would different strategies to opening-up a country’s capital
account from an initial state of financial autarky have different impacts on the
economy and on welfare?
To study these policy questions, I simulate various opening-up scenarios.
As demonstrated below, households adjust their consumption/saving behavior
quite differently under various opening-up scenarios. For example, a consump-
tion crunch is more dramatic when a reform is unanticipated and once-and-
for-all. I show as well that the impact of the liquidity crunch caused by financial
integration can be mitigated by forming a rational expectation of regime change,
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or by adopting a more gradual transitioning policy.
2.2.1 Models of Various Opening-up Scenarios and Fiscal Poli-
cies
Unanticipated, once-and-for-all reform
I first follow the convention of modeling financial integration as an unan-
ticipated once-and-for-all event. This approach is embraced by many dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium models of financial integration for its simplicity.
Specifically, I let t0 denote the date of the opening up, beyond which point the
capital account will be completely opened to the outside world. Before t0, no
one expects reform to occur. In this way, the opening up is treated merely as an
unexpected shock to the economy.
Anticipated Reform
To model an anticipated regime change, I let t0 denote the date of the open-
ing up, beyond which point the capital account will be completely opened to
the outside world. In addition, households are perfectly informed T periods in
advance that there will be a reform in period t0. Therefore, households have T
periods to adjust their bond positions in preparing for the regime change. Obvi-
ously, when T is sufficiently large, this scenario converges on that under rational
expectations, in which case there is perfect expectation of the regime change and
thus nothing surprising occurs when a government makes the announcement
at t0 − T . Note that the forward-looking financial intermediaries in this scenario
are able to adjust their bond schedules in response to the reform.
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Gradual Reform with Fiscal Transfer
As in the previous cases, t0 denotes the date of reform. However, instead
of a once-and-for-all liberalization of the capital account, I let the opening-up
occur gradually. In doing so, the government imposes tax rate x0 on capital
outflow.1 In period t0, the government begins lowering the tax rate according
to xt = (1 − t/T )x0. This tax cut happens gradually and the government takes
T periods to reduce the tax rate to zero. The tax income is used to finance a
lump-sum transfer τt(st) at t0. I let the transfer be wealth-dependent, such that it
could be interpreted as a government “bailout” program when the unexpected
reform occurs.
I choose one particular structure for this wealth-contingent transfer, as fol-
lows: I find b¯ ∈ R and p¯i ∈ R++, the transfer τ(b) = pi if b0 < b¯, and τ(b) = 0
otherwise. That is, households are given the lump-sum transfer if their bond
positions at the beginning of period t0 are below b¯. The government’s inter-
temporal budget constraint is:
Gt + xtBhomet −
∫
τt(b)dµit(s, b, d f ) = R f tGt + 1
where Gt is the government’s asset holding at t, xt is the tax rate on capital out-
flows, Bhomet is the capital outflow at period t, and
∫
τt(b)dµit(s, b, d f ) represents
1The initial tax rate x0 is chosen to be the lowest possible value to prevent capital outflow.
39
the total transfer in period t (τt(b) = 0, ∀t > t0). Under equilibrium, the govern-
ment chooses one pair (b¯,Π) ∈ R×R++ to maintain a balanced fiscal transfer (i.e.,
G∞ = 0.)
2.2.2 The Dynamics of Interest Rates and Endogenous Borrow-
ing Limits
In the “unanticipated, once-and-for-all” reform scenario, the short-run dynam-
ics of world interest rates (upper-left panel, Figure 2.1) are characterized by
a sharp initial fall followed by a gradual adjustment to the new steady state.
Households from less developed financial markets try to adjust in the direction
of their higher target bond positions whereas households in the U.S. start to
borrow more in response to the availability of cheaper capital. The reason for
the interest rate overshooting is that, on the initial asset distribution, the adjust-
ment process is more severe in emerging countries with less efficient financial
intermediation (C2) relative to that of the United States (C1). The interest rate
dynamic is accompanied by the evolution of the borrowing limit (upper-right
panel, Figure 2.1). The endogenous borrowing limit in C2 decreases from about
60% to 52% of income to adjust for the rising interest rate and higher default
rate.
In the “anticipated” reform scenario, financial integration occurs 20 periods
after the government announces the news (middle-left panel, Figure 2.1). The
domestic interest rate in C2 (C1) gradually declines (rises) as it gets closer to
the date of reform. The movement of domestic interest rates during the pre-
integration era is driven by the forward-looking behavior of households who
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readjust their target bond positions in preparation for the upcoming regime
change. For example, consumers with the largest debtor positions in C2 would
have an incentive to adjust towards lower levels of debt as t0 approaches. Since
one household’s debtor position is another household’s creditor position, the
domestic interest rate must drop to reduce the creditor’s holdings of financial
claims. Also, because this deleveraging happens in advance, the world interest
rate can be equalized around the new steady-state level immediately following
capital account liberalization in period 20. The evolution of the borrowing limit
(middle-right panel, Figure 2.1) also reveals an interesting trend. The endoge-
nous borrowing limit in C2 (C1) is gradually tightened (relaxed) from about
60%(90%) to 52%(101%) of income during the pre-integration era. It is some-
what counter-intuitive that the falling (rising) interest rate is accompanied by
a tightening (relaxing) debt limit. This result is driven mainly by the forward-
looking behavior of financial intermediaries who update the debt contracts in
C2 (C1) to prepare for the rising (falling) default rate as the date of reform ap-
proaches.
In the “gradual” reform scenario, the capital tax initially creates a wedge
between the two domestic interest rates, but they slowly converge on the world
interest rate through a 20-year window as the capital tax is gradually reduced
(bottom-left panel, Figure 2.1). The endogenous borrowing limit evolves also in
a gradual fashion (bottom-right panel, Figure 2.1). The borrowing limit in C2
(C1) is gradually tightened (relaxed) during the pre-integration era.
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Figure 2.1: Transitory Dynamics of World Interest Rate (Left) and Endoge-
nous Borrowing Limit (Right)
For “unanticipated, once-and-for-all” reform (Top); “anticipated, once-and-for-all” reform,
(Middle); and “unanticipated but gradual” reform (Bottom). (Green line is C2 and blue line is
C1)
2.2.3 A Potential Liquidity Crisis Caused by a Sudden Capital
Outflow
To investigate the impact of financial integration on domestic credit markets, I
look at the dynamic of the default population.
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In the “unanticipated, once-and-for-all” regime-change scenario, the dy-
namic of the default population in C2 is characterized by a sudden spike during
the reform, gradually declining toward the steady-state level (upper-left panel,
Figure 2.2). The default population spikes at t = 0 because the reform is unex-
pected. Moreover, the default premium that is embedded in the bond sched-
ule was not properly adjusted to reflect the high default rate at the time of the
reform, as banks did not expect the opening up (and subsequent immediate
default) at t−1. As a result, some banks would fail during the reform period,
subsequently leading to reducing the wealth of some of their creditors.2 All
banks adjust their bond schedules (risk premia) immediately following the re-
form, taking into account the probability of future default.
In the “anticipated” regime-change scenario, the spike in the default popu-
lation during the reform period is mitigated by half because forward-looking
households have already adjusted their bond positions before the opening up
(middle-left panel, Figure 2.2). In this scenario, banks also foresee the opening
up before t0 and so the risk premium is properly adjusted to reflect the default
rate change after the reform. As a result, banks are able to maintain zero profits
throughout these transition periods.
In the “gradual” reform scenario, the default population in C2 at the period
of the reform remains very low (lower-left panel, Figure 2.2). This is because
the government’s fiscal transfer during that period bails out households who
are under heavy debt. The fiscal transfer also protects the banks from being
hurt by an otherwise unexpectedly high default rate. Moreover, the fraction
2Because this model assumes a zero-profit banking sector, the negative profit in the reform
period will lead some banks to fail. Under other assumptions, these banks would be able to
charge a higher risk premium in future periods to make up for their impaired balance sheets.
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of the population with poor credit records remains at a low level during the
transitioning periods.
Note also that the fraction of households in the United States (emerg-
ing countries) with poor credit records ends up reaching a higher (lower)
steady state under all three scenarios because lower (higher) interest rate in the
United States (emerging countries) induces a higher (lower) debt-to-income ra-
tio, which in turn leads to a higher (lower) steady-state default fraction.
2.2.4 Transitory Dynamics of Current Account and Foreign As-
set Positions
The dynamics of current account and foreign asset positions are similar across
the three opening-up scenarios, except that the accumulation of foreign assets
(liabilities) is slower under the “gradual” reform. These patterns reveal an ini-
tial current account surplus (deficit) associated with the accumulation of foreign
assets by C2 (C1). Furthermore, about 12 years (20 years with gradual reform)
after financial integration, this situation reverses to one in which the C2 starts to
run permanent current account deficits balanced by international interest pay-
ments from the United States (Figure 2.3).
2.3 Welfare Implications
In this section I explore the welfare effects of integration for each country in
various opening-up scenarios. The use of heterogeneous-household framework
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Figure 2.2: Transitory Dynamics of Default Population
“unanticipated, once-and-for-all” reform (Top); “anticipated, once-and-for-all” reform,
(Middle); and “unanticipated but gradual” reform (Bottom). (Green line: C2, Blue line: C1)
allows me to distinguish how these impacts may vary between various wealth
classes (i.e., poor vs. rich).
45
To accomplish the former, I compute a welfare measure similar to the no-
tion of Equivalent Variation (EV) for households across wealth cohorts. Such
an approach to welfare analysis is adopted in Panousi and Angeletos (2011).
To accomplish the latter, I consider the aggregate utility of the whole economy
(with equal weight on all households) over all transitioning periods. The whole
analysis is repeated for different opening-up scenarios and fiscal policies.
2.3.1 Welfare Impact for Various Wealth Classes:
Quantitatively, for a country j, I focus on households whose realization of pro-
ductivity is in the “middle state”, letting V i∞,aut(b) denote the value functions
in the autarkic steady state, and letting V i0,int(b) denote the value functions at
the beginning of the reform period, respectively. The task is to compute, for
each level, the bond position b and a compensating transfer e j(b) such that
V i∞,aut(b + e j(b)) = V
i
0,int(b). The interpretation of e j(b) runs as follows: suppose
that an emerging country that is currently in financial autarky contemplates the
option of liberalizing its capital accounts to enable it to integrate financially with
the United States. For a particular bond position b, e j(b) is the minimal compen-
sation that a household with bond position b would agree to accept in return for
the cancellation of such a reform. Therefore, e j(b) is closely related to the notion
of Equivalent Variation.3
For this exercise, I then express the corresponding compensating differential
as a fraction of the household’s annual income. The resulting number represents
3Equivalent Variation is often interpreted as the change in a consumer’s wealth that would
be equivalent to a price change in terms of its welfare impact. See Mas-Colell, Whinston and
Green (1995).
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a welfare gain if it is positive and a welfare loss if it is negative. These welfare
gains and losses for various wealth cohorts are illustrated in Figure 2.4 for each
of the two countries and three opening-up scenarios.
I first consider the benchmark scenario of “anticipated once-and-for-all” re-
form (blue lines) for C2 (two panels on the right). In general, financial integra-
tion benefits the rich at the expense of the poor: the poor suffer losses, whereas
the rich enjoy gains. The intuition is the following. Financial integration raises
interest rates in C2, leading to a decline in the present discounted value of fu-
ture household labor income. This hurts all households, but the adverse effect is
stronger on the poorer ones, since consumption in poorer households depends
more on labor income. Meanwhile, the higher interest rate implies that both re-
turns on savings and the cost of borrowing have increased. These effects benefit
the rich at the expense of the poor as rich households are creditors while poor
households are debtors. For extremely rich households who are in the right tail
of the wealth distribution, the positive effect is strong enough to offset the neg-
ative effect, so these households benefit from financial integration. In addition,
the extreme poor in the left tail of the wealth distribution are those who suffer
the most, because declining credit capacity forces these households to undergo
a deleveraging process, which results in a short-run consumption crunch.
For C1 (two panels on the left), the situation is quite the opposite. The poor
and the middle class gain, while the very rich lose. The intuition for these re-
sults is analogous to that for C2. C1’s poor gain immediately upon integration
because of the increase in human wealth and relaxed borrowing limits, while
the rich lose because of lower returns on their bond holdings. Moreover, it can
also be observed that the abovementioned welfare effects are mitigated in the
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Table 2.1: Aggregate Equivalent Variation
Unanticipated Anticipated Gradual
C1 0.0435 0.0041 0.0148
C2 -0.0321 (-0.0364) -0.0071 -0.022 (-0.0219)
other two opening-up scenarios.
Accounting for the asset distribution, I can compute the aggregate equiva-
lent variation for the whole economy. Table 2.1 summarizes the aggregate wel-
fare gains and losses across all households for each country. These numbers
show that, in general, C1 benefits from financial integration while C2 suffers.
Moreover, the social welfare lost in C2 could be reduced by adopting a more
gradual and anticipated opening-up strategy.
2.4 Conclusion
This essay studies a potential credit-crunch event stemming from sudden cap-
ital outflow during financial integration between emerging countries and the
United States.
In the short run, a sudden, once-and-for-all financial integration may po-
tentially result in a credit crunch in emerging countries: such capital market
integration will raise the interest rates in these countries and suppress the en-
dogenous borrowing limit; thus, a fraction of agents will become financially
distressed, subsequently generating a temporarily high risk premium, a high
default rate, and a consumer-spending crunch.
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This paper provides not only a possible explanation of the abovementioned
stylized facts, but also important policy lessons pertaining to how an emerging
economy should liberalize its capital accounts from an initial state of financial
autarky. To investigate this issue, the paper conducts several policy experiments
associated with various opening-up scenarios.
The paper first follows the convention of modeling the financial integration
as an “unanticipated, once-and-for-all” event. This is embraced for its simplic-
ity by most dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models for financial inte-
gration. I then ask: what if the government perfectly informs households in
advance that the country’s capital account will be liberalized during certain
periods. Such an “anticipated” opening-up scenario is similar to the case un-
der rational expectations, in the sense that agents and financial intermediaries
perfectly foresee the future regime change and respond accordingly. The third
policy experiment corresponds to a “gradual” opening-up scenario. Using this
“gradual” strategy, the government imposes a tax on capital flows. Initially
the tax rate is sufficiently high to preclude international capital mobility. Af-
ter the reform, the government gradually reduces the tax rate. In addition, the
government uses the tax income to provide a bailout program by means of a
wealth-contingent wealth transfer.
The paper shows that consumption crunches and defaults are significantly
stronger under “unanticipated, once-and-for-all” reforms, compared with those
under the “anticipated” and “gradual” reform strategies. Furthermore, “antic-
ipated” and “gradual” reform protects domestic financial intermediaries from
being hurt by a large-scale credit default.
Using a framework consisting of a large number of heterogeneous house-
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holds allows the model to track the change in wealth distribution and consump-
tion distribution in each country affected by the financial integration. Following
financial integration, wealth distribution becomes more dispersed in the United
States as well as the emerging countries, implying growing wealth inequality.
Moreover, the wealth distribution gradually shifts to the right for households
in emerging countries whereas for households in the U.S. it shifts to the left.
In the short run, the consumption inequality in the United States is mitigated
due to improved credit conditions following financial integration. The analysis
of Equivalent Variations provides the welfare implications of financial integra-
tion across various wealth levels as well as at the aggregate level: the bene-
fit of financial integration is higher (lower) for wealthy households relative to
the poor in emerging economies (the U.S). These welfare impacts are strongly
linked with the shape of a country’s wealth distribution. At aggregate level,
emerging economies (the United States) may suffer (benefit) from financial inte-
gration. In addition, the paper shows that gradual change in financial openness
mitigates these differences, leading to higher overall welfare. Accordingly, the
paper argues for a more gradual approach to capital account opening for emerg-
ing countries.
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Figure 2.3: Transitory Dynamics of Foreign Asset Position (A) and Current
Account (B)
“unanticipated, once-and-for-all” reform (Top); “anticipated, once-and-for-all” reform,
(Middle); and “unanticipated but gradual” reform (Bottom). (Green line: C2, Blue line: C1)
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Figure 2.4: Welfare Implication
The blue line in this figure represents the welfare effects in the first opening-up scenario (i.e.
unanticipated, once-and-for-all reform), the green line represents the welfare effects in the
second opening-up scenario (i.e. anticipated, once-and-for-all reform), the red line represents
effects in the third opening-up scenario (unanticipated but gradual transition with fiscal
policy). The dotted blue line takes into account the wealth hair cut of depositors during
unanticipated reform. The dotted red line takes into account the fiscal transfer (”bail-out”)
during the gradual reform
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CHAPTER 3
THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL DISRUPTIONS ON BUSINESS CYCLES
3.1 Introduction
The financial market is important insofar as it helps allocate funds to the most
productive investors. Financial market trouble interferes with efficient alloca-
tion of resources, leading to a significant decline in output. In 2008, virtually all
advanced economies and many emerging markets experienced deep recessions.
A common feature of these recessions was that they were accompanied by credit
crunches coinciding with a sharp declines in capital prices, a type of episode
commonly referred to as “financial disruption” (Claessens, Kose and Terrones,
2011). The need to understand such unprecedented economic contractions and
concurrent financial market turmoil that have occurred since World War II mo-
tivated me to develop a stylized macroeconomic model that highlights the in-
trinsic linkage between financial disruptions and business cycles.
In retrospect, we can see that episodes of financial disruption differ
markedly from typical business cycles (Mendoza 2010). For example, the
volatility of business cycle fluctuation had been low in the United States from
the mid-1980s into the first decade of the 2000s. In sharp contrast, this era of
“great moderation” ended with a severe economic contraction associated with
financial disruption, whereby the U.S. economy experienced highly synchro-
nized declines in output, credit, and the value of capital as well as spikes in
volatility and the risk premium. The amplitude of these fluctuations ran far be-
yond the scale of normal business cycles. Moreover, a rich body of empirical lit-
erature that has reported evidence from a wide range of countries suggests that
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recessions associated with financial disruptions tend to be significantly longer
and deeper than other recessions (Reinhart and Rogoff 2008, Claessens, Kose
and Terrones, 2011). These findings suggest that financial disruptions should be
modeled as rare, distinct episodes in business cycles during which the system
behaves differently from how it behaves in normal cycles.
Moreover, financial disruptions seem to be recurring scenarios marked by
certain empirical regularities. Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) argue that the 2008 fi-
nancial disruption was qualitatively and quantitatively comparable to 18 earlier
post-war financial crises in industrialized countries. For example, they found a
common slowing of economic growth on the eves of such episodes (Reinhart
and Rogoff, 2008). Based on historical data taken from 48 countries, Mendoza
and Terrones (2008) find that most episodes of financial disruption in emerg-
ing markets were associated with credit booms. All these regularities suggest
that financial disruptions might not happen completely randomly. Therefore,
to understand the intrinsic linkage between financial disruptions and business
cycles, it is important to explore the nature of these events: to what extent are
financial disruptions exogenous and to what extent do they simply evolve as
outcomes of dynamic equilibrium?
To address these issues, this paper develops a stylized macroeconomic
model with credit frictions. In order to characterize rare episodes of extraordi-
nary financial disruption and understand their intrinsic linkages with business
cycles, the model I propose incorporates two distinct regimes, “normal cycles”
and occasional episodes of “financial disruption,” and endogenizes the switch
between these two regimes, so that financial disruptions are rare, endogenous
episodes evolving over business cycles.
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Several studies have made serious efforts to explain how financial frictions
amplify shocks. For example, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Bernanke, Gertler,
and Gilchrist (1999) argue that, due to financial frictions and the resulting con-
straints on borrowing, the reduced net worth of levered agents lends to leads
to drop in prices for their assets, further lowering their net worth, in a vicious
circle.
The recent global economic crisis returned this issue to the forefront of eco-
nomic concerns. Since then, a new stream in the macro literature on endogenous
risk and periodically binding financial constraints has begun to emerge. For ex-
ample, Mendoza (2010) uses a business cycle model with a collateral constraint
to explain financial crashes and subsequent deep recessions for a small, open,
emerging economy. The model shows that precautionary savings limit collateral
constraint binding to occasional occurrences followed by sudden stops. The pa-
per highlights the importance of using nonlinear global methods to characterize
periodically binding credit constraints. Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2013) de-
velop a continuous time model in which they do not assume that after a shock
the economy drifts back to the steady state, instead allowing the length of the
slump to remain uncertain.
My paper builds on the aforementioned literature. Like Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997) and Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2013), I assume that there exist two
types of agents, high-productivity agents and low-productivity agents, distin-
guished by their contrasting ability to produce output using capital and labor.
In this paper all agents are rational, forward-looking, and risk averse. Agents
can default on their liabilities at any time, so bonds are traded only if bond pay-
ments are backed by collateral. Capital serves as a factor of production and as
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collateral for loans. Both bonds and capital are traded in the financial market.
Since the return on capital is higher if it is owned by high-productivity
agents, in equilibrium high-productivity agents accumulate capital stocks
through leverage. Due to the debt enforcement problem, there is a maximum
level of leverage determined by the financial market, which depends on the
market’s projection of the future value of collateral. The equilibrium leverage of
high-productivity agents occasionally hits the endogenous maximum level, in
which case they become financially constrained. Because of the precautionary
motive, there is only a low probability that the leverage constraint binds, while
the absence of constraint characterizes the economy most of the time. Thus,
the model is able to incorporate two distinct regimes: “normal cycles” and rare
episodes of “financial disruption.”
During normal cycles high-productivity agents are not financially con-
strained, and they are thereby able to maintain an optimal level of capital stock
through collateral borrowing. Therefore, during normal business cycles distur-
bances in the system remain near the center of the stochastic steady state distri-
bution whereby the economy is having an efficient capital allocation. In other
words, during normal cycles shocks are not amplified by the financial market.
During episodes of financial disruption, high-productivity borrowers are fi-
nancially constrained, in which case they must sell capital to low-productivity
agents, leading to lower capital prices. The decline in capital prices generates
an adverse feedback loop by shrinking financial wealth, in particular the value
of collateralizable capital, which further suppresses borrowing capacity in the
presence of credit frictions. Meanwhile, financial disruptions have a strong neg-
ative impact on business cycles as they result in misallocation of capital to low-
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productivity agents, leading to a loss of efficiency in production. This explains
why economic contractions associated with financial disruptions are stronger
than typical recessions during normal cycles.
Due to this highly nonlinear spiral effect, financial disruptions have unique
features such as Fisher debt deflation, plunging output and capital prices, and
rising risk-premia and Sharpe Ratios associated with capital, all of which are
significantly different from market conditions in normal cycles. Moreover, be-
cause it takes time for levered agents to rebuild their wealth, recovery from a
financial disruption might be slow, and in these circumstances the scale of the
slump is uncertain.
The switch between the two regimes is endogenous, the probability of which
gradually changes with equilibrium leverage. Specifically, when the leverage
ratio of high-productivity agents is far below the endogenous maximum level,
the probability of financial disruption is relatively low; when high-productivity
agents’ leverage ratio approaches the maximum level, the probability of finan-
cial disruption is high, as even a small shock could force the leverage constraint
to bind. The evolution of equilibrium leverage depends on the history of macro
shocks that affect all agents’ balance sheets. Thus, rare episodes of financial
disruptions are not caused entirely by exogenous shocks. Instead, financial dis-
ruptions are equilibrium outcomes evolving with the state of the economy.
In order for the system to switch endogenously between two distinct
regimes, the model must be solved globally with multiple periodically bind-
ing constraints. I solve for the full dynamics of the model using a projection
method similar to that of Kubler and Schmedders (2003). The solution is char-
acterized within the entire state-space as a stationary Markov equilibrium, and
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the modeling results are presented in a reasonably calibrated example.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 briefly re-
views the relevant literature. Section 3.3 introduces the model and characterizes
the solution; Section 3.4 discusses the quantitative properties of the model; Sec-
tion 3.5 highlights some key model features and presents the simulated results;
Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
There is a substantial body of macro literature focusing on the effects of finan-
cial friction on the macro economy. Early studies explored various financial fric-
tion mechanisms in stylized setting. For example, Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997)
show that endogenous agency costs can potentially alter business cycle dynam-
ics. Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) use information asymmetry to explain how
the distribution of wealth across firms, intermediaries, and investors affects eco-
nomic activity. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) introduce the debt enforcement prob-
lem and study how the price of collateral assets interacts with business cycles.
A comprehensive framework linking financial friction with real activities is
developed by Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), whose study can be seen
as a synthesis of these earlier studies on financial frictions, incorporating some
of their New-Keynesian features into the model in order to enhance its empirical
relevance. The BGG framework is widely adopted in studies of numerous rel-
evant topics such as exchange rate policy (Cespedes, Chang, and Velasco 2004
and Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci 2007), banking and monetary policy (Ger-
ali, Neri, Sessa and Signoretti 2010), and housing values (Aoki, Proudman and
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Vlieghe 2004; Iacoviello 2005).
Following the most recent financial crisis, studies emphasizing its non-linear
effect on the economy with periodically binding financial constraints began to
emerge, including the aforementioned Mendoza (2010) and Brunnermeir and
Sannikov (2013). Moreover, Heathcote and Perri (2012) document a systematic
negative relationship between wealth and volatility. Perri and Quadrini (2013)
introduce a two-country model with credit shocks appearing as the results of a
self-fulfilling equilibrium. By solving the model in the global state-space, they
are able to endogenize the severity of economic contractions.
On the other hand, there is also a substantial body of finance literature focus-
ing on financial market equilibrium and the impact of market frictions on the
dynamics of financial variables, namely asset prices, leverage, and the credit
supply. For example, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) use moral hazard and adverse
selection under asymmetric information to explain why credit may be rationed
in equilibrium. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argue that the liquidation value of
assets may be low in poor economic times, accounting for the private cost of
leverage, which can explain the variation in debt capacity. Geanakoplos (2010)
assumes heterogeneous beliefs to show that equilibrium determines not only in-
terest rates but also leverage, and that leverage cycles could lead to fluctuations
in asset prices. Araujo, Kubler, and Schommer (2010) and Brumm, Grill, Kubler,
and Schmedders (2013) develop models with equilibrium default, the former
investigating the effect of collateral requirements on risk sharing with the latter
examining the collateral value of long-lived assets. Rampini and Viswanathan
(2010) study collateral equilibrium from the view of corporate finance. They
show that more productive firms may be more likely to exhaust their debt ca-
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pacity and that capital may be less efficiently deployed in downturns. He and
Krishnamurthy (2012, 2013) develop a continuous-time model focusing on the
role of financial intermediaries on asset pricing. The former study generates ob-
served patterns during financial crises, including the Sharpe Ratio, volatility, the
correlation of asset prices, and interest rates. The latter replicates the dynamics
of risk premia during crises.1
My paper fits into both of the abovementioned streams of the literature by
highlighting the macro-financial linkage through collateral borrowing. I show
that when the leverage ratio of an economy is high, there exists an endogenous
vicious circle that could potentially synchronize economic contractions and dis-
ruptions of financial markets.2 The financial market foresees the future risk,
and therefore asset prices and collateral requirements all change with the equi-
librium leverage.
Last but not least, Kubler and Schmedders (2003) provide a theoretical foun-
dation for my paper. Building upon the work of Duffie, Geanakoplos, Mas-
Colell, and McLennan (1994) and Geanakoplos and Zame (2002), Kubler and
Schmedders assume the existence condition of stationary Markov equilibria for
a dynamic pure exchange economy with incomplete markets and collateral con-
straints. They show that such stationary Markov equilibria can be characterized
1Many other papers belonging to these two strands are also relevant but cannot be discussed
here in detail. See Goldstein and Razin (2013) for an extensive review of theories of financial
crisis, and see Brunnermeir, Eisenbach, and Sannikov (2012) for a comprehensive survey of the
literature on macroeconomics with financial frictions.
2In other words, financial disruptions and the associated economic contractions are not nec-
essarily caused by large, disastrous shocks. When the equilibrium leverage approaches to its
endogenous maximum level, even small exogenous shocks can occasionally trigger large con-
tractions.
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by a mapping from exogenous shocks and the current distribution of financial
wealth to prices and portfolio choices. I extend this equilibrium concept to a
production economy.
3.3 The Model
3.3.1 Basic Environment
(1). Two Types of Agents: There are two types of agents (h ∈ {1, 2}) in the
proposed model, distinguished by their unequal ability to use cap-
ital productivelyhigh-productivity agents measured by µ1 and low-
productivity agents measured by µ2. The total population of the econ-
omy is normalized to one (µ1 + µ2 = 1). Following Brunnermeier and
Sannikov (2013) as well as Perri and Quadrini (2012), I also assume that
high-productivity agents discount the future more than low-productivity
agents. The difference in the discounting factor βh implies the equilibrium
leverage, as revealed in the data.3 In the Appendix, I verify that without
the difference in βh, the underlying mechanism of the model remains the
same.
(2). Preference: Both types of agents have standard CRRA utility. u(ct) =
c1−γt
1−γ
(3). Technology: Both types of agents produce according to CobbDouglas tech-
nology:
θh(st)k
φ
h l
1−φ
h
3One alternative approach would be to model the tax benefit on external borrowing. The
assumption of heterogeneous discounting factors is more intuitive and avoids unnecessary dis-
tortion of the economy.
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where kh is the capital owned by a type-h agent and lh is the labor hired
by a type-h agent. θh is the type-specific stochastic process for productiv-
ity. λθ1(st) = θ2(st), with λ < 1,∀st, that is, type 1 (the expert) being more
productive than type 2 at all nodes of the history.
(4). Capital k: There is a fixed amount that equals one unit of capital k that can
be used as collateral. The unit of capital is traded in every period so that
its allocation {k1, k2} and price qk are determined in equilibrium.
(5). Bond b: A bond is a one-period security with zero-net supply. It promises
one unit of consumption good at each period. Agents can default on their
bond liabilities at any time; therefore, bonds must be backed by capital k.
The equilibrium collateral requirement κ varies across nodes of the history,
as the market anticipates changes in the future value of collateral.
(6). Uncertainty: The only exogenous shocks are productivity shocks. At each
period t ≥ 0 one of M possible exogenous shocks st ∈ S = {1, ..,M} occurs.
One history path up to period t is denoted by st ∈ S T , which corresponds
to one node on the entire event tree S T . The productivity process follows
an AR1 process with persistence ρ and standard deviation δ.4
Assuming no individual-level risk, or perfect risk sharing within each type,
the aggregation can be taken within each type. Thus, I can study a representa-
tive household for each type.
4In the numerical simulation, the AR1 process is approximated by a first-order Markov tran-
sitioning matrix with M states.
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3.3.2 Budget Constraint
A type-h agent starts the period with financial net worth ah,t, which equals the
current market value of the agent’s existing capital stocks and bond holdings
(i.e., ah,t = qkh,tkh,t−1 + bh,t). After observing productivity θh(s
t) for the period, the
agent decides how much capital Kh,t to invest in production. Similar to Perri
and Quadrini (2009) and Kubler and Schmedders (2003), I assume intra-period
production, that is, capital input allows the agent to generate output in the same
period.5 The budget constraint is
qbh,tbh,t+1 = ah,t + wteh,t − ch,t − qkt kh,t + Fh(kh,t, lh,t, θh(st)) − wtlh,t (3.1)
where ah,t is the beginning period net worth, wteh,t is wage income (the
market equilibrium wage multiplied by the individual labor endowment),
Fh(kh,t, lh,t, θh(st))−wtlh,t equals profits from production (which is production rev-
enue Fh(kh,t, lh,t, θh(st)) minus labor wage payments wtlh,t). After plugging in net
worth ah,t = qkh,tkh,t−1 + bh,t, and using ih,t = q
k
h,t(kh,t − kh,t−1) to denote the net capital
investment, the budget constraint can be re-written as:
ch,t + ih,t − (Fh(kh,t, lh,t, θh(st)) − wtlh,t) − wteh,t = bh,t − qbh,tbh,t+1; (3.2)
that is, consumption ch,t plus net capital investment ih,t minus production profit
Fh(kh,t, lh,t, θh(st))−wtlh,t and wage income wteh,t equals current bond payments bh,t
net of new bond purchases qbbh,t+1.6
5The assumption of intra-period production helps reduce the number of state variables. The
use of inter-period production would not change the key properties of the model but it would
complicate the numerical solution by enlarging the state-space.
6Suppose the production input expenditure occurs before investment revenue materializes;
the agent could then potentially face a cash-flow mismatch within the period. One interpreta-
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3.3.3 Debt Contracts
When discussing debt contracts, it is convenient to denote the positive bond
position and negative bond position separately, as in bh,t(+) = max(0, bh,t), and
bh,t(−) = −min(0, bh,t), and thus bh,t = bh,t(+) − bh,t(−). Moreover, the (net) risk-free
interest rate is: rt = 1/qbt − 1.
The inter-temporal debt contracts are not perfectly enforceable because the
agent can default. Default can take place at any time. Therefore, debt repayment
must be guaranteed by using capital as collateral. Obviously not all capital is
collateralizable. Typically, some capital is super liquid, which can be easily di-
verted in case of default. I use a straightforward approach by assuming that an
agent with k units of productive capital can use k as collateral. In other words,
when an agent defaults he can easily divert 1− fraction of his productive capital
in case of default, and banks confiscate all the collateral, which is the remaining
 share of the total productive capital.
Default gives the lender the right to liquidate the agent’s assets. After such a
diversion, however, the only remaining asset is the collateral kh,t. Suppose that
the liquidation value of the capital is kh,tqkh,t+1. The borrower defaults whenever
the market value of the collateral is lower than the value of the debt, that is:
bh,t(−) < kh,tqkh,t. To ensure that borrowers do not default, the total liabilities at
any time must be subject to the following enforcement constraint:
bh,t+1(−) ≤ kh,t+1min
st+1
(qkh,t+1); (3.3)
that is, the value of the debt must be less than the value of the collateral across
tion is that the agent can cover the cash mismatch by issuing risk-free intra-period loans. The
production output is used as collateral so that the loan is always repaid after the revenue begins
to accrue. As the loan is risk-free and within the period, there is no interest.
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all future scenarios.
Following Brumn et al. (2011), the collateral requirement is defined as the
unit of capital required as collateral in order for borrowers to sell one bond.
Then, from equation (3), it is easy to see that the minimum collateral require-
ment κt(st) to guarantee a default-free state is:
κt(st) =
1
minst+1(q
k
t+1)
, (3.4)
and so equation (3) can be re-written as:
bh,t+1(−)κt(st) ≤ kh,t+1; (3.5)
that is, if an agent issues one bond, he is required to put up κ units of capital as
collateral.
3.3.4 Competitive Equilibrium
Under competitive equilibrium, each individual agent takes as given the equi-
librium capital price {qkt (st)}st∈S T , the bond price (and so the interest rate)
{qbt (st)}st∈S T , and the unit labor wage {wt(st)}st∈S T . A type-h agent optimizes his
expected discounted utility by choosing paths of consumption ch = {ch,t(st)}st∈S T ,
capital stocks kh = {kh,t(st)}st∈S T , bond positions bh = {bh,t(st)}st∈S T and labor hiring
lh = {lh,t(st)}st∈S T . The optimization problem is specified below:
max
{ch},{kh},{lh}≥0,{bh}
E{
∞∑
t=0
βthu(ch,t(s
t)) (3.6)
subject to ∀st ∈ S T
ah,t(st) = bh,t(st) + qk(st)kh,t(st) (3.7)
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ch,t(st) + qk(st)kh,t+1(st) + qb(st)bh,t+1(st)
= ah,t(st) + (Fh(kh,t+1, lh,t, θh(st)) − wt(st)lh,t(st)) + wt(st)eh,t(st) (3.8)
bh,t+1(−)(st) ≤ kh,t+1(st) min
st+1
(qkt+1(s
t+1)), (3.9)
where equation (7) and (8) represent the inter-temporal budget constraints
and equation (9) represents the borrowing limit. The paths of prices
{qkt (st), qbt (st),wt(st)}st∈S T are simultaneously determined in equilibrium. Formally,
competitive equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 3 . Competitive Equilibrium:
Competitive equilibrium for the above-described economy with initial allocation of
capital (kh,0)h∈1,2 and initial shock s0 is a collection
{(c1,t(st), b1,t(st), k1,t(st), l1,t(st)), (c2,t(st), b2,t(st), k2,t(st), l2,t(st)), qkt (st), qbt (st),wt(st)}st∈S T
satisfying the following conditions:
(1). For each agent h, the path (ch,t(st), bh,t(st), kh,t(st)), lh,t(st))st∈S T solves the agent’s
utility maximization problem defined by equations (6) through (9).
(2). The bond market clears:
∑
h µhbh,t(st) = 0
(3). The capital market clears:
∑
h µhkh,t(st) = 1
(4). The labor market clears:
∑
h µhlh,t(st) =
∑
h µheh,t(st)
The existence proof given in Kubler and Schmedders (2003) can be general-
ized to show that there exists a Markov equilibrium equivalent to the competi-
tive equilibrium defined above. Furthermore, it can be shown that all aggregate
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variables (e.g., w, qk, qb, y, Ωi) and policy correspondences (e.g., ch(:, :), bh(:, :),
kh(:, :), lh(:, :)) depend on the distribution of wealth in the economy as well as the
exogenous state. In the environment in which my model operates, the endoge-
nous state-space can be reduced to a single variable − the wealth share of the
high-productivity agent:
Ω1 =
µ1a1∑
h=1,2 µhah
=
qkk1 + b1∑
h=1,2 µh(qkkh + bh)
=
µ1(qkk1 + b1)
qk
(3.10)
The formal definition of the Markov equilibrium is given as follows:
Definition 4 . Stationary Markov Equilibrium:
The stationary Markov equilibrium is a collection of each agent h’s consumption
decisions ch(Ω1, s), bond holdings bh(Ω1, s), capital holdings kh(Ω1, s), labor hiring
lh(Ω1, s), the bond price qb(Ω1, s), the price of capital qk(Ω1, s), and the wealth distribu-
tion characterized by Ω1, such that:
(1). For each agent h, the decision rule (ch(Ω1, s),bh(Ω1, s),kh(Ω1, s)) solves the agent’s
utility maximization problem defined by equations (6) through (9).
(2). The bond market clears:
∑
h bh(Ω1, s) = 0
(3). The capital market clears:
∑
h kh(Ω1, s) = 1
(4). The labor market clears:
∑
h lh(Ω1, s) =
∑
h eh(s)
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3.4 Parameters and Characterization of Equilibrium
3.4.1 Calibration
The quarterly time series data covers the entire era of great moderation from
mid-1980s to 2012. To distinguish the statistics corresponding to episodes of “fi-
nancial disruption” with those corresponding to “normal cycles”, the data series
are split into two sets associated with these two regimes. The event windows
for “financial disruption” are based on the NBER-dated contractions associated
with severe financial downturns, while other time periods are considered “nor-
mal cycles”.7
Because the mechanism of the model is highly endogenous, the number of
parameters needed to be calibrated is relatively small. The risk-aversion param-
eter γ is set to standard values widely adopted in the literature. Parameter φ can
be mapped to the target using the equilibrium condition. Other parameters are
calibrated jointly using the simulated method of moments. The model is simu-
lated at bi-quarterly frequency. Table 3.1 summarizes all the parameter values
and how they are determined.
Both types of agents have identical preferences. For the utility parameter,
the coefficient of risk-aversion in CRRA utility γ is set as the standard value 2,
which equals the value used in Kubler and Schmmedders (2003).
The total population is normalized to 1. The 2012 Global Entrepreneur-
7During the great moderation era, the U.S. economic contractions associated with severe
financial downturns include the 1989-91 U.S. saving-and-loan crisis and the 2008-2010 financial
crisis.
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Table 3.1: Parameter Values and Targeted Statistics
Variable Value Targets or Sources
φ 0.3 Capital share during normal cycles is 30%
γ 2 Risk aversion parameter value used by Kubler
and Schmmedders (2003)
β1, 0.980 Ergodic probability of crises regime
β2, 0.983 Average short run T-bill rate
µ1 0.2 Fraction of workforce engaged in entrepreneur-
ship by the 2012 Global Entrepreneurship Moni-
tor U.S. Report
 0.6 Average leverage ratio is around 0.5 as in BGG
λ 0.8 Averaged −5% below trend during financial dis-
ruption
θ(s1)/θ(s2) 0.971 Joint Match the AR1 process of GDP growth
p 0.613 Joint Match the AR1 process of GDP growth
ship Monitor U.S. Report published by Babson College and the London Busi-
ness School estimates that, in the United States, approximately 15−20 percent
of adults in the workforce in each age group are engaged in entrepreneurship.
Therefore, the population measure of the expert µ1 is set to 0.2.
The return-to-scale parameter for capital φ is set to match the observed capi-
tal share (30%) in the normal steady state. Each agent is assumed to receive the
same per capita individual labor endowment and is normalized to 1. Hence,
each type of agent supplies labor that equals the population measure for its
type, that is, eh(st) = µh.
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The share of capital that can be used as collateral  is set to 0.6 so that the
implied mean leverage ratio is 0.5, the approximate value in the data and also
the target value in BGG.
Recall that the two types of agents differ in their ability to manage produc-
tion. The ordinaries achieve lower productivity than the experts. The parameter
of the efficiency gap λ is set to 0.8 to match the average percentage decline in
GDP during economic crises.
Because of the endogenous risk, the same exogenous shocks can cause aggre-
gate fluctuations of varying persistency and amplitude. To highlight this point,
the shock process is deliberately kept simple. The only exogenous shock is stan-
dard productivity shock. There are only two levels of productivity output, the
difference between which is within the normal business cycle fluctuation of the
U.S. economy. That is, all rare disastrous contractions are endogenous.
The AR1 process of productivity shocks is discretized using the Gauss-
Hermite polynomial, the implied two-state transitioning Markov matrix is:
 p 1 − p1 − p p
 =
0.613 0.3870.387 0.613

All calibrations are conducted jointly using the Simulated Method of Mo-
ments. Although the above example is highly stylized, it matches some key
features of U.S. data. The resulting statistics seem reasonable (see Table 3.2).
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Table 3.2: Simulated Statistics and Target Values
Variable Names Data Model
Whole Time
Std of GDP growth 0.015 0.014
Autocorrelation of GDP growth 0.26 0.29
Average GDP growth rate 1.34% 1.34%
Normal Cycles
Average GDP growth rate 1.55% 1.54%
Ergodic probability of th regime 82% 82%
Average Duration (quarter) 27 27
Financial Disruptions
Average GDP growth rate -1.20% -1.18%
Ergodic probability of th regime 18% 18%
Average Duration (quarter) 6 6
3.4.2 Characterization of Markov Stationary Equilibrium
Policy Function and Portfolio Choices:
I begin with a discussion of the policy functions of each type of agent. As
shown in the lower-left panel of Figure 3.1, when high-productivity agents have
low wealth as a share of total wealth, they store all their wealth in the form of
capital and borrow as much as they can from low-productivity agents. High-
productivity agents begin reducing their leverage by gradually reducing their
debt obligations only after they obtain all the available capital (see the lower-
right panel of Figure 3.1). This is a natural market outcome (consistent with
the result of Lemma 2) as the return on capital is higher when it is owned by
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high-productivity agents. As shown in the left panel of Figure 3.2, during nor-
mal times (i.e., when the economy is not financially constrained), capital re-
turns are excessive compared with bond returns for high-productivity agents,
whereas the opposite is true for low-productivity agents. In other words, high-
productivity agents prefer capital over bonds whereas low-productivity agents
prefer bonds over capital; thus, high-productivity agents are natural holders of
capital while low-productivity agents are natural holders of bonds.
Equilibrium Output, Wage, Capital Price and Bond Price:
Based on this understanding of the portfolio choices of the two types of
agents, the equilibrium prices and output as functions of endogenous wealth
distribution and exogenous productivity shocks can be explained.
The numerical example shows that GDP and the equilibrium wage both in-
crease with the share of capital owned by high-productivity agents. This is an
intuitive result insofar as the return on capital is higher when high-productivity
agents invest it. Combining this result with agents’ capital holding decisions
establishes the relationship between economic output and high-productivity
agents’ wealth. As demonstrated in the lower panel of Figure 3.3, the wealth
of high-productivity agents affects aggregate output only when they are finan-
cially constrained.
When high-productivity agents are unconstrained, they already own all the
productive capital and thus further increasing the wealth of high-productivity
agents will not improve production efficiency. On the other hand, when high-
productivity agents are financially constrained, they no longer have enough
wealth to keep all their capital stocks (i.e., µ1k < 1). Some of the capital is
72
therefore liquidated to and invested by low-productivity agents, resulting in
inefficient allocation of resources. Consequently, economic output is lower than
its level of efficiency θ(s) (see the lower-left panel of Figure 3.3).
Equilibrium capital prices, like output and wages, also increase as high-
productivity agents take a greater share of total wealth. The mechanism for
this is somewhat intuitive: since capital is valued more by high-productivity
agents when their share of the wealth is higher, more of the economys wealth
is devoted to acquiring capital stock, driving capital prices up. When the
wealth of high-productivity agents is financially constrained, the price of capi-
tal must decline to induce low-productivity agents to acquire capital from high-
productivity agents (see the upper-left panel of Figure 3.3).8 Unlike output and
wages, an increase in high-productivity agents’ wealth may further raise the
price of capital even if they already controlled all the capital because, when
high-productivity agents reduce their leverage, the economy is more resilient
to adverse shocks and therefore the risk of holding capital endogenously de-
creases, making capital a more favorable asset.9
The feedback loop between capital prices and wealth
As in the upper-left panel of Figure 3.3, the price of capital increases (de-
creases) when the share in the wealth of high-productivity agents increases (de-
creases). Meanwhile, any change in capital prices feeds back to the distribution
of wealth. Recall that the evolution of the wealth distribution is characterized
by the transitioning function Ω′1(Ω1, s, s
′) that maps the current wealth share of
8The price of capital also depends on productivity realization because it affects the return
on capital.
9At the individual level, every high-productivity agent also has a more comfortable wealth
cushion to protect against risks.
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high-productivity agents Ω1 to their wealth share in the next period Ω′1. Specifi-
cally:
Ω′1(Ω1, s, s
′) =
µ1[qk(Ω′1, s
′)k′1(Ω1, s) + b1(Ω1, s)]
qk(Ω′1, s
′)
= µ1[k′1(Ω1, s) +
b1(Ω1, s)
qk(Ω′1, s
′)
] (3.11)
As shown on the right-hand-side of equation (11), the future wealth share
depends on the future capital position k′1(Ω1, s), future bond payments b1(Ω1, s),
and the future price of capital qk(Ω′1, s
′). Since high-productivity agents al-
ways have a negative bond position in the stochastic steady state distribution
(i.e. b1(Ω1, s) < 0), a rise in the future price of capital will increase the share
of the wealth for high-productivity agents while a drop in the future price of
capital will decrease that share. Future productivity output s′ affects only fu-
ture capital prices, whereas future capital positions k′1(Ω1, s) and future bond
payments b1(Ω1, s) are already determined for the current period; therefore,
qk(Ω′1, slow) < q
k(Ω′1, shigh)⇒ Ω′1(Ω1, s, slow) < Ω′1(Ω1, s, shigh).
Figure 3.4 illustrates the evolution of the wealth share. Given a bad shock
in the next period, Ω′1 falls below the 45-degree line, implying a decrease in the
wealth share. In comparison, given a good shock in the next period, Ω′1 rises
above the 45-degree line, implying an increase in the share of wealth.
This reinforcing loop between wealth distribution and capital price could
amplify macro shocks, especially when high-productivity agents are financially
constrained in a crisis regime. In that case, a downside shock slow directly re-
presses output and capital prices through lower productivity θ(slow) and indi-
rectly through a lower share of high productivity agents’ wealth Ω′1(Ω1, s, slow).
In contrast, when the leverage of high-productivity agents is far below its en-
dogenous upper limit, a drop in Ω′1(Ω1, s, slow) will not lead to a further decline
in output as high-productivity agents will retain all their capital stocks. In this
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case, the vicious macro-financial linkage breaks.
Endogenous Upper-Limit of Leverage
In equilibrium, the financial market anticipates the endogenous increase in
future risk and responds to it by imposing a more restrictive requirement on
leverage. Following Geanakoplos (2010), the leverage ratio is defined as the
current market value of capital qkk1 divided by the portion of this value that is
self-financed qkk1 + b1. The borrowing constraint in equation (9) implies that the
upper limit of leverage Levmax(Ω1, s) that a borrower can reach is:
Levmax(Ω1, s) =
qk(Ω1, s)
qk(Ω1, s) − mins′(qk(Ω′1, s′))
(3.12)
In comparison, the equilibrium leverage of high-productivity agents is:
Lev1(Ω1, s) =
qk(Ω1, s)k′1(Ω1, s)
qk(Ω1, s)k′1(Ω1, s) + b
′
1(Ω1, s)
(3.13)
As shown in Figure 3.5, the endogenous upper limit of leverage decreases
when the equilibrium leverage becomes “too” high as the financial market an-
ticipates a potential plummet in the future price of capital. It is worth noting
that such endogenous tightening of the collateral requirement cannot prevent
financial disruptions. Nonetheless, this rational and forward-looking behavior
on the part of creditors protects them from massive default when financial dis-
ruptions occur.
Once high-productivity agents become financially constrained, they are no
longer able to keep all their capital stocks, depressing the price of capital and
output. To measure the impact of such a credit crunch on capital investment,
the excess return on capital E(rkt ) − E(rt) and the Sharpe Ratio SRt are computed
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according to:
E(rkh − r) =
q′k
q − θhφ(k′h/lh)φ−1
and
SRh =
E(rkh − r)
σ(rkh − r)
As shown in Figure 3.2, the risk premium on as well as the Sharpe Ratio as-
sociated with capital investment sharply increases for financially constrained
agents.
Having discussed the basic mechanism of the model, I now highlight some
of its key features.
3.5 Model Features and the Simulated Results
Asymmetric Response to Adverse Shocks (Normal Cycles vs. Financial Dis-
ruptions):
Because the system’s reaction to shocks is highly nonlinear, the model is
able to clearly distinguish between normal business cycles and episodes of fi-
nancial disruption. To highlight the differences between normal recessions and
recessions associated with financial disruptions, I conduct two controlled sim-
ulations using the same sequence of shocks (four periods of bad shocks fol-
lowed by a good shock). The only difference between the two simulations is
in the initial endogenous state. In the first simulation (the blue line), the initial
Ω1 = 0.43, which implies that the leverage ratio of high-productivity agents is
very close to the endogenous maximum, which implies that they will be finan-
cially constrained following a bad shock, triggering the financial disruption. In
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the second simulation (the red line), initial Ω1 = 0.55, which implies that the
leverage ratio of high-productivity agents is sufficiently lower than the endoge-
nous maximum to enable them to ride out the sequence of bad shocks without
hitting the debt limit. Therefore, the first simulation corresponds to episodes of
financial disruption whereas the second simulation corresponds to recessions
during normal cycles.
During normal cycles, the system disturbance remains close to the center
of the stochastic steady state distribution whereby the economy enjoys efficient
capital allocation, that is, all capital is controlled by high-productivity agents.
In contrast, during a financial disruption, high-productivity agents share in the
wealth is depressed, so they will have to sell capital to low-productivity agents,
pushing the economy into misallocation of resources (see the lower-mid panel
of Figure 3.6)
Recall that the output of the economy (GDP) depends on two elements: the
exogenous productivity shock and the endogenous allocation of capital. During
normal cycles, recessions are driven by adverse productivity shocks. In compar-
ison, during financial disruptions the economy suffers not only from exogenous
downside productivity shocks but also from endogenous loss of efficiency due
to misallocation of capital. Thus, recessions associated with financial disrup-
tions are stronger and longer-lasting than typical recessions during normal cy-
cles (see the upper-left and upper-mid panels of Figure 3.6).
As shown in the upper-right and lower-left panels of Figure 3.6, the risk
premium on capital as well as the Sharpe Ratio rise significantly during financial
disruptions as high-productivity agents are financially constrained.10 This result
10Note that the risk premium and Sharpe Ratio also increase, but only slightly, during normal
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resonates with what was observed in the 2008 financial crisis and is consistent
with the results reported in He and Krishnamurthy (2012).
We can see the asymmetry of the aggregate leverage in the lower-right panel
of Figure 3.6. During normal cycles, high-productivity agents absorb adverse
shocks through collateral borrowing. However, during financial disruptions
high-productivity agents have to borrow less instead of borrowing more, due to
the collapse in value of the collateral. In addition, in these circumstances high-
productivity agents lose some capital, further depressing their ability to commit
to new loans. Consequently, aggregate lending is depressed.
Endogenous Risk of “Financial Disruption”:
Because the collateral constraint binds only occasionally, the likelihood of
which changes the entire state-space, “financial disruption” is an endogenous,
low-probability event. The endogenous risk of “financial disruption” manifests
itself in the varying expected future volatility of the economy. Figure 3.7 plots
the conditional variance of next-period capital prices (left panel) and GDP (right
panel). Here we can clearly see that, when high-productivity agents share of the
wealth (and so their absolute wealth) is high (i.e., the leverage ratio is far be-
low the endogenous upper limit), aggregate variables such as GDP and capital
prices are fairly stable. In this case, the risk of “financial disruption” is low as
high-productivity agents are able to absorb bad shocks using their comfortable
wealth cushion and stay at the optimal investment level. In contrast, when high
productivity agents wealth is low and their leverage ratio is approaching the
endogenous upper limit, even a small adverse shock could trigger an episode
of “financial disruption.” In that case, capital prices and GDP are knocked off
recessions. This is in large degree due to the persistency of the exogenous shock process.
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balance as high-productivity agents are less able to cushion the shocks.
This feature of the model is consistent with the stylized empirical facts that
economic volatility is counter-cyclical and volatility has a systematic negative
relationship with agents’ wealth.11 In addition, a simulation covering 1000 peri-
ods reveals wide, low-frequency output volatility swings associated with grad-
ual changes in aggregate wealth.
Uncertain Trough:
Financial frictions prolong the impact of a shock on the economy as it takes
time for levered agents to rebuild their wealth after the shock. Once an economy
is hit by an exogenous shock, it may not be able to rebound to its normal state
immediately. The depth of the recession and the length of the recovery depend
on the liquidity of high-productivity agents. If the economy were already in a
volatile regime with high leverage, a subsequent negative shock can push the
economy further into crisis. In this sense, the trough is uncertain and so is the
duration of the contraction.
Figure 3.9 plots an episode of financial disruption of median depth relative
to all financial disruptions simulated over 10,000 periods. It demonstrates that,
once the economy enters an episode of financial disruption (corresponding to
the area below the red dashed line), any subsequent bad shock will push the
economy further into contraction. Moreover, the economy may not able to re-
bound to the unconstrained state after a good shock. Once it enters an episode
of financial disruption, the system is vulnerable to shocks and the economy is
11For example, Heathcote and Perri (2013) find that in the U.S. over the course of the past cen-
tury there has been a systematic negative relationship between household wealth and business
cycle volatility.
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prone to a multiple-dip recession.
As a result, the stationary distribution takes a double-humped shaped, with
one peak near the center of the steady state distribution and the other at the
left-side tail of the distribution (see Figure 3.10). This suggests that high-
productivity agents remain financially depressed and the economy may be
stuck in crisis mode for quite a long time once it sets in.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I study the full equilibrium dynamics of an economy with two
distinct regimes, “normal cycles” and rare episodes of “financial disruption.”
I develop a model in which two types of households with differing levels of
productivity coexist in an infinite-horizon production economy. Because the re-
turn on capital is higher when it is invested by high-productivity agents, they
are the natural holders of capital. Due to the debt enforcement problem, how-
ever, there is a borrowing limit, which depends on the market’s projection of
the future value of capital put up as collateral. Because of the precautionary
motive, the borrowing limit binds occasionally, triggering financial disruption,
while the economy spends most of its time in unconstrained normal cycles.
Since the two types of agents differing regarding the return on their invest-
ment, the distribution of wealth affects the true underlying state of the economy.
Interaction between the two types of agents in the entire state-space equips the
model with several features such as endogenous risk, asymmetric response to
shock, endogenous credit crunches, and uncertain troughs. These features allow
my model to achieve the following:
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1. The model characterizes two distinct regimes over business cycles and
highlights their differences. During normal cycles, high-productivity agents are
able to maintain an optimal level of capital stocks and absorb adverse shocks
through collateral borrowing. In episodes of financial disruption, such high-
productivity agents are financially constrained, in which case they have to sell
capital to low-productivity agents, leading to lower capital prices. The decline
in the price of capital generates an adverse feedback loop by shrinking the value
of collateral, further suppressing borrowing capacity. Due to this highly nonlin-
ear spiral effect, financial disruptions have unique features such as Fisher debt
deflation, sudden declines in both output and capital prices, and increases in
both the risk premium and Sharpe Ratios associated with capital. Moreover,
given the time it takes for levered agents to rebuild their wealth, a recovery
might be slow and the scale of the slump is uncertain.
2. The model illustrates how business cycles and financial disruptions inter-
act. On the one hand, financial disruptions have a strong negative impact on
business cycles as they result in the misallocation of capital to low-productivity
agents, reducing the efficiency of production. This explains a well established
empirical regularity according to which recessions associated with financial dis-
ruptions tend to be stronger and deeper than typical recessions during nor-
mal cycles. On the other hand, financial disruptions are equilibrium outcomes
evolving with business cycles: the probability of regime switching depends on
the history of macro shocks that affect equilibrium leverage. In other words,
the model shows that major turmoil in real economic and financial markets is
not necessarily caused by rare disastrous events. As equilibrium leverage de-
termines the scale of contraction, even small shocks could sporadically trigger
large contractions. Moreover, the financial market responds endogenously to
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changes in business conditions. In other words, the credit crunches and delever-
aging that are typical of crises could be an outcome of rational expectations as
the financial market anticipates future adjustments in asset prices when there is
a business slowdown.
The model emphasizes the importance of wealth in linking the financial mar-
ket with the real economy. The only market friction is the possibility of default,
and therefore collateral is required to obtain loans. When the equilibrium lever-
age of the financial market is high, the market tends to be instable: once high-
productivity agents lose portions of their wealth, the financial market might be
unable to allocate funds to the most productive users, leading to a joint decline
in the price of capital and output. To highlight this credit market friction while
controlling for other possible principle-agency problems, the mechanism of the
model operates in a relatively simple environment in which households are the
ultimate owners of the economy. In this way I embed firms’ financing decisions
in those of firm owners.
Insofar as economic crises are endogenous equilibrium scenarios, I believe
this model is useful for discussing the potential role of government policies in
preventing future financial crises and simulating recovery. I leave these discus-
sions to future studies.
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Figure 3.1: Policy Plot
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Figure 3.2: Risk Premium and Sharpe Ratios
Figure 3.3: Aggregate Prices, Output and Leverage
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Figure 3.4: Evolution of the Endogenous State Variable Ω1
Figure 3.5: Equilibrium Leverage vs. the Upper Limit
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Figure 3.6: Asymmetric Response in Cycles
Dashed line plots normal cycles; solid line plots financial disruption.
Figure 3.7: Endogenous Volatility of the Economy
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Figure 3.8: Simulated GDP Volatility of an Economy
Figure 3.9: Uncertain Trough
87
Figure 3.10: Histogram: Stationary Distribution of High-Productivity
Agents’ Wealth Share
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX FOR ESSAY ONE
Figure A.1: Non-Performing Loan Ratio for the U.S and Emerging Coun-
tries.
Source: WDI and FRED database.
Figure A.2: Loan-deposit spread for the U.S. and Emerging Countries.
Source: WDI and FRED database.
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Figure A.1 shows the Non-Performing Loan (NPL) ratio for the U.S. and for
emerging countries. (“Emerging Countries” are selected according to the IMF
definition.) Note that NPL ratios are persistently higher in emerging countries
than in the United States. Although this difference narrowed during the U.S
financial crisis (gray area), it widened again after the crisis.
Figure A.2 plots the loan-deposit spread for the U.S. and for emerging coun-
tries. (“Emerging Countries” are selected according to the IMF definition.) Note
that the loan-deposit spread is persistently in emerging countries than in the
United States.
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX FOR ESSAY THREE: REMOVING THE ASSUMPTION ON
HETEROGENEOUS DISCOUNTING FACTORS
The figure below plots the equilibrium aggregate variables with and without
the assumption of heterogeneous discounting factor. As demonstrated in Fig-
ure B.1, the model mechanisms hold without the assumption of heterogeneous
discounting factor.
Figure B.1: Comparison between Models with and without the Assump-
tion of Heterogeneous Discounting Factor.
With heterogeneous discounting factor (red line); Without heterogeneous discounting factor
(blue line).
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